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One-shot coordination games are interesting, not only as models of a significant class of real-
world interactions, but also as posing a puzzle for game theory.  Applied to any such game, 
the classical assumptions of best-response reasoning and common knowledge of rationality 
identify a set of two or more Nash equilibria, but do not select any one of these equilibria as 
‘the’ solution.  In many cases, however, real players of these games are remarkably 
successful at coordinating their behaviour.  The puzzle is to explain how they coordinate, and 
on which equilibrium. 
 In their attempts to explain behaviour in one-shot coordination games, game theorists 
have given particular attention to two distinct modelling strategies.  The collective optimality 
approach is exemplified by the principle of payoff dominance in Harsanyi and Selten’s (1988) 
theory of equilibrium selection and by the theory of team reasoning (Sugden, 1993; 
Bacharach, 1999, 2006).  This approach assumes that rational players appraise strategy 
profiles from the viewpoint of the players collectively.  Leaving aside complications resulting 
from isomorphisms (which will be discussed later), the payoff dominance principle selects 
the Nash equilibrium profile (if one exists) that Pareto-dominates all other such equilibria.  
Team reasoning selects the strategy profile (if one exists) that is uniquely optimal for the 
players collectively.  The bounded best response approach is exemplified by level-k theory 
(Stahl and Wilson, 1994; Nagel, 1995; Costa-Gomes, Crawford and Broseta, 2001) and 
cognitive hierarchy theory (Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2004).  This approach assumes that 
players use a limited number of stages of best-response reasoning, anchoring their beliefs on 
the assumed behaviour of strategically naïve individuals. 
 Accumulated experimental evidence suggests that neither approach can give a 
satisfactory explanation of behaviour across the whole range of coordination games.  The 
main obstacle to a unified explanation seems not to be that individuals differ in the modes of 
reasoning they use.  Instead, it is that games differ in the modes of reasoning that they evoke.  
There have been various conjectures about which properties of coordination games facilitate 
or inhibit the two kinds of reasoning.  In particular, it has been suggested that reasoning based 
on collective optimality may be inhibited if players have conflicting preferences over 
equilibria, if the collectively optimal solution gives the players unequal payoffs, or if that 
solution, although Pareto-efficient ex ante, is Pareto-dominated ex post (Crawford, Gneezy 
and Rottenstreich, 2008; Bardsley et al., 2010).  This paper reports experimental tests which 
support these conjectures.  We conclude that behaviour in coordination games is best 
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explained as resulting from two fundamentally distinct modes of reasoning, one based on 
collective optimality, the other on bounded best responses; which mode is most likely to be 
used depends on particular properties of the game being played. 
 We study a class of two-player diagonal coordination games, defined as follows.  
Each player (P1 or P2) chooses from the same set {s1, …, sm} of pure strategies, where m 2.  
If strategy sk is chosen by both players, P1’s payoff is z1,k > 0 and P2’s payoff is z2,k > 0; 
otherwise, both payoffs are zero.  Thus, there are m pure-strategy equilibria along the main 
diagonal of the payoff matrix; all off-diagonal payoffs are zero.  This class includes pure 
coordination games, defined by zi,k = zj,l for all i, j, k, l, and Hi-Lo games, defined by zi,k = zj,k 
for all i, j, k and zi,k  zi,,l for some i, k, l.  If there are strategies j, k such that z1, j > z1,k and z2, j 
< z2,k, there is conflict of interest between the players with respect to the corresponding 
equilibria, as in Battle of the Sexes games.  Diagonal coordination games present equilibrium 
selection problems in their purest form, since the only payoff information by which pure-
strategy equilibria can be differentiated from one another is contained in the equilibrium 
payoffs themselves.1  These games are relatively easy for experimental subjects to 
understand, particularly if the off-diagonal payoffs are represented as zero increments of 
money, because the amount of information that players have to process is relatively small, 
and because, even in games with a large number of strategies, the strategic structure is very 
simple.2  We focus on games in which, for each player, any differences between the positive 
payoffs on the main diagonal are small relative to differences between these payoffs and zero.  
Thus, players have a strong incentive to coordinate. 
 We simplify further by using experimental coordination games in which strategies are 
not labelled in ways that make any equilibrium strongly salient, independently of its payoffs.  
It is well known that, in pure coordination games in which one equilibrium is uniquely 
                                                          
1 It is possible that, by focusing players’ attention on equilibrium payoffs, diagonal coordination 
games may make team reasoning more salient, and strategic reasoning less salient, than in 
coordination games with non-zero off-diagonal payoffs.  Even so, we think it is a good research 
strategy to begin with the simplest games in which the two theoretical approaches have divergent 
implications. 
2 In contrast, the 33 and 44 payoff matrices used by Colman, Pulford, and Rose (2008) and Colman, 
Pulford, and Lawrence (2014) to test cognitive hierarchy and team reasoning theories seem much less 
easy for subjects to think about.  In these experiments, there is some evidence of team reasoning, but a 
large proportion of subjects behave as level-0 or level-1 cognitive hierarchy reasoners (see Sugden, 
2008 for this interpretation of the results in the earlier paper).  Since level-0 behaviour is random and 
level-1 reasoning is effectively non-strategic, these results suggest that subjects’ cognitive abilities 
may have been over-taxed. 
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salient, players are often successful in coordinating on that equilibrium as a ‘focal point’ 
(Schelling, 1960; Mehta, Starmer and Sugden, 1994).  We minimise the effects of label 
salience so as to allow a more focused investigation of the effects of variations in payoffs.  
Nevertheless, such an investigation may throw light on the reasoning by which players use 
labels to find focal points.  Most theoretical accounts of this reasoning follow one or other of 
the two approaches we have outlined.  Some explanations work by transforming a labelled 
pure coordination game into a Hi-Lo game in which the focal equilibrium payoff-dominates 
the other equilibria (Bacharach, 1993; Sugden, 1995; Casajus, 2000).  Other explanations use 
a hierarchy of cognitive levels, as in level-k theory, and assume that the non-strategic choices 
of the least sophisticated players tend to favour focal labels (Lewis, 1969: 24–36; Bacharach 
and Stahl, 2000; Crawford, Gneezy and Rottenstreich, 2008). 
 We begin with a description of how the two approaches explain behaviour in 
coordination games and with a brief review of existing evidence (Section 1).  We then present 
our experimental design.  We derive predictions from two theories – specific versions of 
team-reasoning and level-k theory – which exemplify the collective optimality and bounded 
best response approaches.  Formalising suggestions that have been made in previous 
literature, we offer three conjectures about how particular properties of diagonal coordination 
games might facilitate or inhibit reasoning about collective optimality.  We derive 
implications of these conjectures that can be tested in our experiment (Section 2).  Our results 
reveal that, as expected, neither theory is consistently successful, and confirm the 
implications of two of the three conjectures (Section 3).  We show that this conclusion would 
still stand if other recognised exemplars of the collective optimality and bounded best 
response approaches were used (Section 4).  In the light of these findings, we suggest that it 
is unlikely that any single theory will be found to explain behaviour in coordination games 
(Section 5). 
1.  Existing theory and evidence 
1.1  Payoff dominance and team reasoning 
Game theorists have often invoked the principle that rational players, faced with a problem of 
selecting among Nash equilibria, would reject any equilibrium that was strictly Pareto-
dominated by another equilibrium.  This is the principle of payoff dominance (Harsanyi and 
Selten, 1988: 80–82). 
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 In using this principle, account needs to be taken of isomorphisms in the games to 
which it is applied.  In pure game theory, it is conventional to make the implicit assumption 
that players lack a common language for identifying strategies, other than by referring to 
mathematical properties of the payoff matrix.  Given the presupposition that game-theoretic 
recommendations are common knowledge, this assumption implies that strategies that are 
isomorphic in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten (1988: 73–76) are chosen with equal 
probability.  For example, consider the diagonal coordination game G = <(10, 10), (10, 10), 
(9, 9)> (that is, a game with m = 3 in which the payoff combinations along the main diagonal 
are (10, 10), (10, 10) and (9, 9)).  Because the two (10, 10) equilibria are isomorphic with one 
another, neither of them is attainable as the determinate outcome of a recommendation that is 
common knowledge.  A 50:50 probability mix of these two equilibria is attainable, but (if 
payoffs are defined in utility units) this mix is payoff-dominated by (9, 9) (Crawford and 
Haller, 1990; Blume, 2000).  If in addition there is no common-language labelling of players, 
a similar analysis applies to isomorphisms between players.  For example, in the game G = 
<(10, 9), (9, 10), (9, 9)>, (10, 9) and (9, 10) are isomorphic with one another, and so (9, 9) is 
payoff-dominant. 
 The theory of team reasoning provides an alternative explanation of why payoff-
dominant equilibria are chosen in coordination games.  This theory was first proposed as a 
formalisation of rule utilitarianism by Hodgson (1967) and Regan (1980); it was later 
developed by Sugden (1993) and Bacharach (1999, 2006).  In this paper, we use Bacharach’s 
version of the theory, in which each player chooses her component of the team-optimal 
profile of strategies – that is, the combination of strategies that gives the best payoff to the 
players collectively (or ‘as a team’).  The implications of team reasoning and payoff 
dominance coincide for pure coordination and Hi-Lo games, but can diverge if a coordination 
game has conflicts of interest. 
 Bacharach (2006, pp. 87–88, 145) assumes that when (in a game for two players, P1 
and P2) each player ‘identifies’ with the group of both players, each recognises a common 
group utility function U(u1, u2), where u1 and u2 are the utility payoffs to P1 and P2 
individually; this function is symmetric (i.e. U(u, u) = U(u, u) for all u, u) and is strictly 
increasing in both arguments.  In applying the theory to experimental games that are played 
by anonymous players who have common knowledge only of material payoffs, we will 
assume that group utility is symmetric, strictly increasing and weakly concave in material 
payoffs.  The symmetry assumption seems unavoidable, given that the group utility function 
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is assumed to be common knowledge and the game is anonymous.  Weak concavity in 
material payoffs implies that group preferences are weakly risk-averse (as assumed by 
Bardsley et al., 2010) and weakly inequality-averse.  
 Some theorists have proposed models in which players can engage in team reasoning 
at different levels of cognitive sophistication, analogous with the levels of individual 
reasoning in level-k theory.  In these models, naïve team reasoners choose their components 
of what they believe to be the team-optimal strategy profile, but they may fail to recognise 
certain ways of achieving team optimality.  Sophisticated team reasoners are not subject to 
these limitations of rationality, but are aware that their co-players may be.  Thus, 
sophisticated team reasoners choose strategies that are team-optimal when chosen by all 
players like themselves, given the behaviour of their naïve counterparts (Bacharach, 1993; 
Bacharach and Bernasconi, 1997; Blume and Gneezy, 2010). 
 It is generally accepted among theorists of team reasoning that team reasoning is used 
only when individual players identify with the players as a group, and that group 
identification occurs only under particular conditions.  Conditions that have been 
hypothesised include the existence of a Pareto-dominated Nash equilibrium (Bacharach, 
2006), the absence of individual incentives to deviate from team-optimal solutions (Smerilli, 
2012), and positive correlation between players’ payoffs (Tan and Zizzo, 2008).  Diagonal 
coordination games necessarily satisfy the first two conditions.  In all the games we 
investigate, there is very strong positive payoff correlation.  Thus, these games are 
particularly suitable for investigating how far players use team reasoning in situations in 
which group identification might be expected to occur. 
1.2  Level-k and cognitive hierarchy theory 
Level-k theory is a theory of non-equilibrium individual reasoning.  It assumes that players 
are of different types, defined by the level of sophistication with which they reason.  At the 
lowest level, ‘level 0’ or L0, players’ decisions are non-strategic (or, in some applications, 
strategically ‘naïve’).3  Players at each higher level are assumed to know the probability 
distributions of the decisions of lower-level players, and to choose best responses to the 
                                                          
3 In principle, it would be possible to interpret ‘strategic naïveté’ to include any mode of reasoning 
that differed from conventional game theory.  In this way, principles of team reasoning could be 
incorporated into the specification of L0 behaviour, and level-k theory might then be said to ‘explain’ 
why, in a coordination game, higher-level players replicate this behaviour.  We suggest that such a 
permissive interpretation of naïveté would trivialise level-k theory. 
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decisions of players at the level immediately below their own.  Cognitive hierarchy theory 
differs by assuming that players at each level above L0 choose best responses to a probability 
mix of the decisions of all levels below their own. 
 In level-k modelling, the default assumption is that L0 choices have a uniform random 
distribution over available pure strategies; the relative frequency of L0 types is often, but not 
always, assumed to be zero (Crawford, Costa-Gomes and Iriberri, 2013: 14).  The former 
assumption implies that, in a two-player game, an L1 player chooses the strategy with the 
highest mean payoff to herself (averaging across her opponent’s strategies), which might be 
interpreted as a plausible representation of strategic naïveté.  In applying level-k theory to 
diagonal coordination games with salient labels, Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich (2008; 
henceforth ‘CGR’) assume that L0 players choose ‘payoff-salient’ strategies, and use ‘label 
salience’ to break ties if two or more strategies are payoff-salient.  They do not give a general 
definition of payoff salience but, on the most natural interpretation, an L0 player who acts on 
payoff salience behaves just like an L1 player who best-responds to uniformly random L0 
choices.  Thus, when strategies do not have salient labels, the level-k model used by CGR 
reduces to the default model except for the numbering of player types and the absence of any 
players who choose at random. 
1.3  Existing evidence 
Neither team reasoning nor level-k theory succeeds in organising the existing evidence of 
behaviour in coordination games.   
 Proponents of the theory of team reasoning have pointed particularly to two bodies of 
evidence.  The first is that the payoff-dominant equilibrium is almost always chosen in two-
strategy Hi-Lo games (e.g. Bardsley et al., 2010).  Intuitively, it is hardly surprising that 
people behave in this way; but this fact requires a theoretical explanation, and the theory of 
team reasoning provides one.  However, the same observation can also be explained by level-
k theory. 
 In an attempt to discriminate between these explanations, Bardsley et al. (2010) ran 
two experiments using Hi-Lo games with nondescript labels in the sense of Bacharach (2006: 
16) – that is, labels that are distinct, but do not differ in ways that can be described using 
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predicates that come to mind easily.4  The two experiments (run in Amsterdam and 
Nottingham respectively) had similar designs but used different labels.  A typical example of 
Bardsley et al.’s games has the array of payoff vectors <(10, 10), (10, 10), (10, 10), (10, 10), 
(9, 9)>.  Because of the isomorphism between the (10, 10) equilibria, (9, 9) is team-optimal, 
but the strategies leading to (9, 9) would not be chosen by level-k reasoners at L1 and above.  
In the Amsterdam experiment, large majorities of subjects chose team-optimal strategies in 
games of this type, but in the Nottingham experiment, contrary to both theories, all strategies 
were chosen with approximately the same frequency.  In both experiments, the Hi-Lo games 
were interspersed with pure coordination games, and the latter used different labels in the two 
experiments.  Bardsley et al. speculate that there was some tendency for the modes of 
reasoning used in pure coordination games to spill over to Hi-Lo games.  Because the focal 
points in the Amsterdam pure coordination games were labelled in ways that made them ‘odd 
ones out’, this may have primed players to think of the unattractive uniqueness of the (9, 9) 
equilibrium as a means of coordination.  The suggestion is that, in the absence of such 
priming, players may fail to recognize the focality of an equilibrium that is Pareto-dominated 
ex post.  This is one of the conjectures that our experiment was designed to test. 
 The second body of evidence is of players using salient labelling features to identify 
focal points in pure coordination games.  As we noted in the Introduction, some explanations 
of the underlying reasoning assume that players use the payoff dominance principle or team 
reasoning, while others assume level-k reasoning.  Much of the evidence from pure 
coordination games is consistent with both theories, but some evidence suggests that the 
salient properties that are used to solve coordination problems are not always the same as the 
properties that stand out for indifferent or naïve individuals, and that might therefore be 
expected to be favoured by L0 players.  The latter properties can be elicited in non-strategic 
‘just pick’ problems, in which choice options are identical except for labelling and lead with 
certainty to exactly the same outcome (Bardsely et al., 2010).5  Intuitively, one might expect 
non-strategic responses to favour labels with positive connotations (for example, ‘smiley’ 
                                                          
4 Bardsley and Ule (2017) use ‘risky coordination games’ to discriminate between the two 
explanations.  In these games, as in Hi-Lo games, the payoff matrix is symmetrical, the players’ 
interests are perfectly aligned, and the pure-strategy equilibria (along the main diagonal) are Pareto-
ranked.  However, the off-diagonal payoffs are such that level-k reasoners would not reach the team-
optimal solution.  Bardsley and Ule’s experimental results support the theory of team reasoning. 
5 Bardsley et al. interpret this as evidence in support of team reasoning and contrary to level-k theory.  
For an alternative interpretation, see Crawford, Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri (2013: 48–49). 
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faces rather than ‘sad’ ones), but labels with uniquely negative connotations are often 
effective as focal points (Rubinstein, Tversky and Heller, 1996).  When odd-one-out labels 
are focal points in pure coordination games, L0 specifications which assume a bias towards 
such labels do not perform well when applied to other types of game (Hargreaves Heap, Rojo 
Arjona and Sugden, 2014).  Taken together, the evidence points to some form of reasoning in 
which each player looks for a solution that is good ‘for us’, and which recognises uniqueness 
among labels as an effective coordination device.  In other words, something like team (or 
payoff-dominance) reasoning seems to be implicated in players’ use of focal points in pure 
coordination games. 
 However, there is also evidence suggesting that the power of focal points is restricted 
to pure coordination games.  CGR report experiments on ‘X-Y’ games – diagonal 
coordination games with m = 2, where the equilibria are isomorphic to one another but one 
has a uniquely salient label.  They find that players coordinate with a high degree of success 
when these are pure coordination games, but that when there is even a small degree of 
conflict of interest, coordination rates are no better than would result from random choice.  
Isoni et al. (2013) investigate a class of ‘tacit bargaining’ games that are formally equivalent 
to X-Y games but framed differently.  In these games, coordination is significantly better than 
random, even when there are conflicts of interest (contrary to CGR’s level-k model), but 
conflicts of interest still reduce coordination rates (contrary to the theory of team reasoning).  
The tendency for conflicts of interest to weaken the power of focal points is inconsistent with 
team reasoning, even if one allows for the possibility that some team-reasoning players are 
naïve.  (In order to use a focal point in a pure coordination game, a team-reasoning player 
must be able to recognise the uniqueness of its label, and to recognise that this uniqueness 
can be used as a means of coordination.  A player with these capacities would presumably be 
capable of using the same focal point in the presence of a small conflict of interest.)  
However, this pattern can be explained by a level-k model in which L0 choices are governed 
by payoff and label salience.   
 CGR also report experiments on a class of ‘pie games’.  These are diagonal 
coordination games with m = 3, where one strategy has a uniquely salient label.  (Equilibria 
are represented as slices in a pie diagram; two slices have the same colour, and the third slice 
is coloured differently.)   One of these games, ‘AM1’, can be described by the array of payoff 
vectors <(6, 5), (5, 6), (5, 5)*>, where the asterisk denotes the salient label.  Game ‘AL1’ is 
described by <(10, 5), (5, 10), (5, 5)*>.  In AM1 and AL1, the strategy with the salient label 
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was chosen by 90 per cent and 83 per cent of subjects respectively, consistently with team 
reasoning but not with CGR’s level-k model.6  However, the theory of team reasoning failed 
in game ‘AM3’, described by <(6, 5), (5, 6), (7, 5)*> and in game ‘AM4’, described by <(6, 
7), (7, 6), (7, 5)*>.  In both these games, team reasoning theory predicts the choice of the 
saliently labelled strategy, but this choice was made by only 29 per cent of subjects in AM3 
and by only 7 per cent in AM4.7 
 Notice that this body of evidence cannot be explained simply by hypothesising that 
players try to coordinate on focal points, and that the determinants of focality differ across 
games.  If the concept of focality (in a two-player game) is to be used in a non-trivial way, it 
must refer to some property by virtue of which a pair of strategies stands out for both players, 
and which each of them uses with the intention of coordinating with the other.8  In most of 
the cases in which players of coordination games behave consistently with level-k theory but 
not with team reasoning, that behaviour is not plausibly explained as an attempt to reach a 
focal point.  For example, consider CGR’s X-Y games, played by University of Chicago 
students, in which the pure-strategy equilibria are labelled ‘Sears Tower’ and ‘AT&T 
Building’.  It seems undeniable that the ‘Sears Tower’ label, which refers to a prominent 
Chicago landmark, stands out for both players, irrespective of whether the equilibrium 
payoffs for the players are equal or unequal.  The effect of introducing small payoff 
inequalities is not to make a different equilibrium stand out as a means of coordination; it is 
to make players less likely to use the fact that ‘Sears Tower’ stands out when reasoning about 
which strategy to choose, and hence to fail to coordinate at all. 
  The evidence we have reviewed suggests that two distinct modes of reasoning – one 
based on bounded best responses, the other on collective optimality – are used in 
coordination games.  A plausible conjecture, compatible with the evidence from AM3 and 
                                                          
6 Bett et al. (2016) report similar results from experiments on diagonal coordination games that are 
similar to AL1 and AL2 except for the absence of salient labels.  In games described by <(6, 7), (7, 6), 
(x, x)>, the proportion of subjects choosing the strategy consistent with (x, x) when x equalled 6.5, 6 
and 5 was respectively 100 per cent, 100 per cent, and 77.8 per cent.    
7 The relevant predictions of team reasoning theory are explained in Section 2.2 below. 
8 Game theorists sometimes use the term ‘focal point’ to describe any equilibrium (in a game with 
multiple equilibria) on which players in fact succeed in coordinating.  Clearly, this ex post concept of 
focality has no explanatory value.  Another usage, specific to level-k and cognitive hierarchy theory, 
is to define an equilibrium as a focal point if the corresponding strategies are chosen with high 
probability by L0 players.  But the evidence we have cited shows that, in some coordination games, 
there is successful coordination on strategies that are not favoured at L0.  
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AM4 and from X-Y games with conflicts of interest, is that reasoning about collective 
optimality is inhibited if the players’ material payoffs in the team-optimal equilibrium are 
unequal.  CGR (p. 1456) invoke a similar idea when they suggest that the use of team 
reasoning is negatively affected by ‘payoff conflict’.  Our experiment was designed to test 
this conjecture. 
2.  Experimental design and hypotheses to be tested 
2.1  The games used in the experiment 
In our experiment, each subject played eighteen diagonal coordination games, modelled on 
CGR’s pie games.  Each game is defined by an array of three strategies <s1, s2, s3> for each 
of players P1 and P2.  In each game, the corresponding array of payoff vectors is <(x, y), (y, 
x), (v, w)>, satisfying x  y > 0, v  w > 0 and {x, y}  {v, w}.  This definition imposes the 
restriction that the payoff vectors for the s1 and s2 equilibria are symmetric with one another, 
but that both are distinct from that for the s3 equilibrium.
9 
 Figure 1 shows an example of the payoff display that was used to describe games to 
subjects.  The game used in this example (G2 in the experiment) has x = 10, y = 9, v = 8 and 
w = 7; payoffs are in euros.  (The strategy labels ‘s1’, ‘s2’ and ‘s3’ were not seen by subjects, 
but have been added to aid interpretation.)  The payoff display was made up of three circles, 
which we will call ‘left’, ‘right’ and ‘bottom’.  The text in each circle showed the payoffs in 
one of the three pure-strategy equilibria, referring to the players only as ‘you’ and ‘the other’ 
to ensure that there was no commonly-known and payoff-independent labelling by which the 
players could be separately identified.  All circles were the same colour (a feature that 
differentiates our experiment from CGR’s).  There were three experimental treatments, A, B, 
and C, which differed only in respect of which equilibrium was shown in which position.  In 
treatment A, the payoffs of the s1, s2 and s3 equilibria were shown to both players in the left, 
right and bottom circles respectively.  The payoff displays for treatments B and C were 
generated by rotating the treatment A display counterclockwise through 120 and 240 degrees.  
In each game, each player independently chose one of the circles by clicking on it.  If they 
                                                          
9 Six of our games have x > y and v > w.  In these games, s1 and s2 are not completely isomorphic with 
one another, because the player who gets the higher payoff in the s1 (respectively: s2) equilibrium gets 
the higher (respectively: lower) payoff in the s3 equilibrium.  Such asymmetries can be relevant for 
level-k reasoning, but we thought it unlikely that they would be salient for players who were looking 
for a focal point for coordination.  We discuss this issue further in Section 3.1. 
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both chose the same circle, their payoffs were as stated on that circle; otherwise the payoff to 
both players was zero. 
[Figure 1 near here] 
 Notice that the only labelling feature that distinguished (x, y) from (y, x) was the 
positioning of the corresponding circles in the payoff display. Our working assumption, 
which we will call positional non-salience, was that this feature would not be sufficiently 
salient for players to be able to use it as an effective coordination device.  However, by using 
the three different treatments, we were able to investigate whether strategy choices were 
influenced by the positioning of the circles. 
 Some readers may be surprised that we did not use scrambled labels (in the sense of 
Crawford and Haller, 1990), for example, by randomising the three rotations of the payoff 
display independently for each player in each game.  But in such a design, (x, y) and (y, x) are 
no longer the payoff vectors of two equilibria that result from distinct (although isomorphic) 
combinations of strategy choices by the two players.  Each player has only two strategically 
meaningful options – either to choose the (v, w) circle, or to choose one of the other two.  If  
both players make the first choice, the outcome is (v, w); if both make the second choice, and 
irrespective of which of the two relevant circles each player clicks on, the outcome is a 
0.5:0.5 probability mix of (x, y) and (y, x).  For the values of v, w, x and y used in our 
experiment, the effect of scrambling would be to reduce our 33 games to 22 Hi-Lo games.  
Since team reasoning and level-k theories make the same predictions for Hi-Lo games, that 
would defeat the object of our experiment. 
 The payoff vectors of the games G1–G18 used in the experiment are shown in Table 
1.  The rows and columns of this table provide a structure for classifying the games.  This 
structure reflects the conjectures that the experiment was designed to test.  Each row contains 
games characterised by a different combination of equality (x = y, v = w) or inequality (x > y, 
v > w) in the equilibrium payoffs.  Each column contains games characterized by a different 
relation between the equilibrium payoffs.  The s3 equilibrium is strictly Pareto-dominated by 
both the s1 and s2 equilibria in games with y > v.  It is weakly Pareto-dominated if y = v and 
either x > y or v > w; it is weakly Pareto-dominating if w = x and either x > y or v > w; and it 
is strictly Pareto-dominating if w > x.  If either v > x  y > w or x > v  w > y, the s3 
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equilibrium is not Pareto-comparable with the other equilibria.10  Because of the requirement 
that the s3 equilibrium has a distinct payoff vector, the combination of x = y and v = w implies 
that the s3 equilibrium is either strictly Pareto-dominated or strictly Pareto-dominating, and so 
three cells of Table 1 are necessarily empty.  If x > y and v > w, Pareto non-comparability 
implies either x > v > w > y (making the s3 equilibrium unambiguously more equal than the 
others) or v > x > y > w (with the opposite effect).  As we were interested in whether 
considerations of payoff equality affected subjects’ propensities to use team reasoning, we 
included games representing both these cases (G9 and G10).  Apart from this exception, there 
is exactly one game in every cell that is consistent with the general restrictions we have 
imposed on payoffs. 
[Table 1 near here] 
 Since our objective was to investigate the respective conditions under which 
individuals are most likely to use collective-optimality and bounded best-response modes of 
reasoning, we need to know what each of these modes imply about behaviour in our games.  
Each of them can be formulated in a range of alternative theoretical models.  We will focus 
on two specific theories, representative of the two approaches.  After reporting our findings in 
relation to these theories, we will consider whether our main conclusions are sensitive to our 
choice of representative theories. 
 In the following two sections, we present predictions derived from the representative 
theories.  We emphasise that our prior expectation, based on the existing evidence 
summarised in Section 1.3, was that neither theory would perform well across all eighteen 
games.  Our interest was in the pattern of successes and failures that we would find.                 
2.2.  Predictions of the theory of team reasoning 
We use Bacharach’s (1999, 2006) theory of team reasoning as the representative of the 
collective optimality approach.  We assume that the group utility function is symmetrical, 
increasing and weakly concave in material payoffs (see Section 1.1 above). 
 The payoff vectors of games G1–G18 were chosen so that, given that there is 
positional non-salience, the choice of s3 by both players is the uniquely team-optimal strategy.  
                                                          
10 There are two further possibilities, not represented in our experiment: (i) that the s3 equilibrium 
Pareto-dominates one but not both of the other equilibria, and (ii) that the s3 equilibrium is Pareto-
dominated by one but not both of the other equilibria. 
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To see why, notice that if neither s1 nor s2 has a uniquely salient distinguishing feature, the 
team-optimal choice must be either (i) that both players choose s3 or  (ii) that each player 
independently randomises between s1 and s2, choosing each of these strategies with 
probability 0.5.  Let Z(z1, z2) be the group utility function defined with respect to the players’ 
material payoffs z1 and z2, normalized so that Z(0, 0) = 0.  Then group utility is Z(v, w) in 
case (i) and (using the symmetry assumption) Z(x, y)/2 in case (ii).  Given that x  y > 0 and v 
 w > 0, it is sufficient for unique team-optimality of (i) that Z(w, w) > Z(x, x)/2.  Since, by 
weak convexity, Z(x/2, x/2)  Z(x, x)/2, it is sufficient that Z(w, w) > Z(x/2, x/2) or (using 
increasingness) w > x/2.  In our games, the value of w is never less than 0.7x.11  Thus, the 
theory of team reasoning (as we have formulated it) predicts that, in every game, the 
proportion of s3 choices is 1 for both players.  These implications are recorded in the first 
column of Table 2. 
[Table 2 near here] 
 In games G9 and G11–G18, the assumed properties of group utility imply Z(v, w)  
Z(x, y) = Z(y, x).  This inequality is strict for G12–G18, and is also strict for G9 and G11 if 
group utility is strictly concave.  Thus, since the s3 equilibrium can be uniquely identified by 
its payoffs alone, s3 is team-optimal in these games independently of how strategies are 
labelled.  In the remaining games, the conclusion that s3 is team-optimal could in principle be 
reversed if either s1or s2 had a uniquely salient label.  However, for s1 or s2 to be team-
optimal, the salience of its label must be extremely pronounced.  For example, consider G3 = 
<(10, 10), (10, 10), (9, 9)>. Suppose that if both players follow the rule ‘Choose whichever of 
s1 or s2 has the more salient label’, each player identifies s1 as ‘more salient’ with independent 
probability q, where q > 1/2.  Then the probability that this rule will lead to coordination is 
given by q* = q2 + (1 – q)2.  Given our assumptions about group utility, s1 is team-optimal if 
and only if q*  0.9, or equivalently, q  0.95.  Since it seemed unrealistic to expect this 
degree of correlation between players’ judgements about which of two positions in the payoff 
display was more salient, we thought it reasonable to assume positional non-salience when 
designing tests of the theory of team reasoning.  However, if significant number of players do 
not choose s3, our design allows us to investigate whether (for subjects as a whole, and/or at 
                                                          
11 In our notation, CGR’s games AM1, AM3 and AM4 satisfy the condition w > x/2, making s3 team-
optimal independently of the salience of its label.  In their AL1 game, the s3 equilibrium (5, 5)* is 
team-optimal if Z(5, 5) > Z(10, 5)/2.  This inequality is implied by symmetry, increasingness and 
weak concavity. 
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the individual level) there are systematic asymmetries in the distribution of choices between 
s1 and s2.  
 In testing the theory of team reasoning, our null hypothesis is that subjects choose 
strategies at random.  Our alternative hypothesis is thus:  
Hypothesis 1 (team reasoning):  In each of games G1–G18, the aggregate 
proportion of s3 choices is greater than 1/3. 
This hypothesis is conservative: one might reasonably argue that if the theory of team 
reasoning were ‘really’ true, the aggregate proportion of s3 choices in each game would be 
much greater than 1/3.  No deterministic theory of human decision-making can be expected 
to yield absolutely correct predictions, but one might at least hope that such a theory would 
out-predict the hypothesis that individuals choose at random.  
2.3 Predictions of level-k theory 
Our representative bounded best-response theory is level-k theory, specified such that L0 
choices are uniformly distributed over the three strategies.  The only assumption we make 
about the distribution of levels of reasoning in the population is that the proportion of players 
at L1 or higher is greater than 0.  We also assume that utility payoffs are the same as (or 
linear transformations of) material payoffs.   The proportions of s3 choices predicted by this 
specification of level-k theory, disaggregated by players’ levels of reasoning, are shown in 
Table 2.  The derivation of these predictions is explained in Appendix 1 [intended for online 
publication].12  
 As in our tests of team reasoning, our null hypothesis is that subjects choose strategies 
at random: 
Hypothesis 2 (level-k reasoning): In each of games G1–G7, G9 and G11, the 
aggregate proportion of s3 choices is less than 1/3.  In each of games G8, G10 and 
G12 – G18, the aggregate proportion of s3 choices is greater than 1/3. 
This hypothesis, like Hypothesis 1, is conservative.   Nevertheless, the two hypotheses 
contradict one another for nine of the games we investigate.  This leaves plenty of room for 
each of the theories to fail.  
                                                          
12 Level-k theory has additional implications, shown in Appendix 1 but not in Table 2, about the 
distribution of choices between s1 and s2.  Since the theory of team reasoning has no corresponding 
implications (it predicts that s1 and s2 are not chosen), we focus on predictions about s3 choices. 
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2.4  Three conjectures 
Our objective was to test conjectures about the conditions under which each theory was more 
or less likely to work well.  We will formulate these conjectures in terms of conditions that 
might facilitate or inhibit team reasoning – that is, make team reasoning more or less likely.  
But this is merely a matter of wording: in the context of our investigation, facilitating team 
reasoning is the same thing as inhibiting level-k reasoning (and conversely).  Our background 
assumption, supported by the existing evidence reviewed in Section 1.3, is that behaviour in 
diagonal coordination games is explained by some (as yet, not fully known) combination of 
the two theories. 
 The payoff vectors of the games in the experiment were chosen to allow us to 
investigate the following three conjectures, informed by the previous literature: 
Conjecture 1: Other things being equal, equality of material payoffs in the team-
suboptimal equilibria (i.e. x = y) inhibits team reasoning. 
In terms of Table 1, Conjecture 1 proposes that within any column (that is, holding constant 
the Pareto-dominance relationships between equilibria), team reasoning is more likely in a 
game in the second row than in a game in the first, and more likely in a game in the fourth 
row than in a game in the third.  The underlying intuition is that it is psychologically easier to 
think of oneself as playing one’s part in a joint action if the alternatives to so acting lead to ex 
post payoff inequality. 
Conjecture 2: Other things being equal, equality of material payoffs in the team-
optimal equilibrium (i.e. v = w) facilitates team reasoning. 
Thus, within any column of Table 1, team reasoning is more likely in a game in the third row 
than in a game in the first, and more likely in a game in the fourth row than in a game in the 
second.  The underlying intuition is that it is psychologically easier to think of oneself as 
playing one’s part in a joint action if all participants benefit from it equally.  Given that the 
payoff vectors of the s1 and s2 equilibria are symmetric, as in our set-up, it is natural to think 
of v = w as equivalent to ‘the players benefit equally from their both choosing s3’.  This 
equivalence would be less obvious in a diagonal coordination game such as <(10, 5), (10, 5), 
(11, 11)>, in which the team-suboptimal equilibria are not symmetric.  
Conjecture 3: Other things being equal, team reasoning is inhibited if, ex post, 
each of the team-suboptimal equilibria strictly or weakly Pareto-dominates the 
team-optimal equilibrium (i.e. [y > v] or [x > y = v] or [y = v > w]). 
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Thus, within any row of Table 1, team reasoning is more likely in a game in the third column 
than in a game in the first or second.  The intuition is that, when two equilibrium payoff 
vectors are isomorphic and neither has a uniquely salient label, some individuals may lack the 
cognitive sophistication to recognise that the best attainable strategy for the players jointly is 
to choose the uniquely unattractive equilibrium. 
 Conjectures 1–3 are formulated in terms of the modes of reasoning that players use, 
not the choices that they ultimately make.  Since our experimental design does not allow us to 
elicit modes of reasoning independently of decisions, these conjectures can be tested only in 
terms of their implications for players’ strategy choices.13  More specifically, these 
implications refer to variations in the proportion of s3 choices between pairs of games which 
differ along particular dimensions.    
 Consider any pair of games (G, G) such that (‘condition 1’) exactly one of 
Conjectures 1–3 proposes that team reasoning is more likely in G than in G (and, by 
implication, that level-k reasoning is less likely).  Assume (‘condition 2’) that level-k theory 
predicts that s3 choices are equally or less likely in G than in G.  Then if the relative 
frequencies of the two modes of reasoning were constant across the two games, s3 choices 
would be equally or less likely in G.  (Recall that the theory of team reasoning predicts that 
s3 is chosen with probability 1 in all games.)  Assume also (‘condition 3’) that level-k theory 
implies that, in G, s3 is chosen with probability less than 1 by players at some level higher 
than L0.  Then, if the relevant conjecture were true, the greater use of team reasoning in G 
might induce a higher proportion of s3 choices than in G.  Thus, pairs of games that satisfy all 
three conditions can be used to test whether the proportion of s3 choices changes from G to G 
in a direction that is consistent with a specific conjecture but not consistent with the 
assumption that each mode of reasoning is used with constant frequency.  Using all such pairs 
of games, we construct the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3.1 (consistency with Conjecture 1):  In each of the pairs of games (G1, 
G2), (G3, G4), (G5, G6), (G8, G9) and (G8, G11), the proportion of s3 choices is 
higher in the second game than in the first.  
                                                          
13  It is possible to use experimental designs which elicit modes of reasoning independently of 
decisions.  For example, van Elten and Penczynski (2015) reconstruct players’ modes of reasoning in 
coordination games from the texts of ‘recommendation’ messages that they send to other players.  
One of their findings is that ‘TR3’ messages that refer to the difficulty of coordinating on one of two 
isomorphic equilibria are very uncommon.  This finding gives some support to Conjecture 3. 
18 
 
Hypothesis 3.2 (consistency with Conjecture 2):  In each of the pairs of games (G1, 
G3), (G2, G4), (G6, G67), (G9, G11), (G10, G11) and (G13, G14), the proportion 
of s3 choices is higher in the second game than in the first.  
Hypothesis 3.3 (consistency with Conjecture 3):  In each of the pairs of games (G2, 
G9), (G6, G9), (G4, G11) and (G7, G11), the proportion of s3 choices is higher in 
the second game than in the first.  
2.5  Experimental procedures 
A total of 126 subjects participated in the experiment at the CEEL Lab of the University of 
Trento in April 2014.  Seven sessions were conducted, each with eighteen participants.  
Subjects were undergraduate students (52.0 per cent from economics and management, 50.0 
per cent females, 91.6 per cent Italians).  The experiment was programmed using the z-Tree 
platform (Fischbacher, 2007).  The instructions for the experiment (reproduced in the original 
Italian and in English translation in Appendix 2 [intended for online publication]) were 
provided to subjects in written form, and were also read aloud by the experimenter to ensure 
that they were common knowledge.  Participants’ understanding of the instructions was 
checked using a short questionnaire; we did not proceed with the experiment until all 
participants had answered all questions correctly. 
 Each subject played games G1 to G18 in the eighteen consecutive ‘rounds’ of the 
experiment.  There was no feedback until all eighteen rounds had been conducted.  In each 
round, subjects were matched anonymously; each matched pair of co-players then played one 
of the games, with the same treatment (A, B, or C, corresponding with different rotations of 
the payoff display) for both players.  One co-player in each pair played as P1, the other as P2; 
but (as explained in Section 2.1), games were described to subjects only in terms of ‘you’ and 
‘the other’.  Co-players were rematched between games in such a way that each pair of 
subjects were co-players in no more than two games.  The order in which the games were 
played by different subjects were counterbalanced to control for order effects.  Each subject 
played nine games as P1 and nine as P2, and played six games in each of the three 
treatments.14 
                                                          
14 The matching of co-players, assignment of games to rounds and treatments, and assignment of 
subjects to player roles were predetermined for each session.  This protocol is explained in Appendix 
3 [intended for online publication]. 
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 At the end of the experiment, one of the eighteen rounds was randomly selected and 
subjects were paid according to the outcome of the game they had played in that round.  
Average earnings for each participant were €6.23.  Each subject also received a show-up fee 
of €3.  The average length of a session was approximately 40 minutes.15 
3.  Results 
In this Section, we consider those features of the results that are most relevant for tests of the 
two theories and of our three conjectures.  The full results of the experiment, with strategy 
choices disaggregated by game, player role and treatment, are presented in Appendix 4 
[intended for online publication]. 
3.1.  Tests for effects of labelling and non-isomorphism 
Hypothesis 1, which states implications of the theory of team reasoning, was derived under 
the assumption that any asymmetries between s1 and s2 were insufficiently salient to be 
effective coordinating devices.  We need to check whether our observations are consistent 
with that assumption. 
 We do this by investigating how far the aggregate choices of players who did not 
choose s3 were skewed towards one or other of s1 or s2.  If, contrary to our assumption, it was 
team-optimal for players to use asymmetries between s1 and s2 as a means of coordination, 
one would expect a very high degree of skew in these choices.  The distributions of choices 
between s1 and s2 in each of the eighteen games are shown in Table 3.  In games in which s1 
and s2 are isomorphic (that is, either v = w or x = y), any systematic asymmetries between the 
frequencies with which they are chosen can be explained only as the result of labelling.  
When s1 and s2 are not isomorphic, it is also conceivable that players could coordinate on one 
of them by using payoff information (for example, by following the rule ‘Choose whichever 
of s1 or s2 favours the player who is also favoured by s3’).  For each game and each treatment, 
we test the null hypothesis that each of s1 and s2 is equally likely to be chosen; we report the 
p-value for a two-tail binomial test.  For games in which the two strategies are not 
isomorphic, we also report this test for data pooled across all three treatments, to check 
                                                          
15 The experiment reported in this paper was preceded by a pilot experiment, using a smaller set of 
games and with different subjects.  The pilot is reported by Faillo, Smerilli and Sugden as ‘The roles 
of level-k and team reasoning in solving coordination games’, Working Paper 6-13 of Cognitive and 
Experimental Economics Laboratory, University of Trento (2013). 
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whether players used payoff asymmetries between s1 and s2 as coordination devices.
16  The 
pooled tests show no significant asymmetries.   
[Table 3 near here] 
 Although there are relatively few individual game/treatment pairs in which label-
based asymmetries are statistically significant, the aggregate data suggest small but 
systematic asymmetries in treatments A and B.  In treatment A, s1 was shown in the left circle 
and s2 in the right.  Summing over all eighteen games, there are 347 (non-independent) 
observations of choices of s1 or s2; 218 of these (62.8 per cent) are of s1.  In treatment B, s1 
was shown in the bottom circle and s2 in the left.  Of the 372 choices of s1 or s2, 150 (40.3 per 
cent) are of s1.  In contrast, there was no consistent asymmetry in treatment C, in which s1 
was shown in the right circle and s2 in the bottom, where the 361 choices of s1 or s2 were 
almost equally divided between s1 (172 choices) and s2 (189 choices).  However, the 
asymmetries observed in treatments A and B fell far short of the levels that would make 
deviations from s3 team-optimal.  (For example, the 218: 129 asymmetry in treatment A 
implies a probability of coordination of only 0.533.) 
   This leaves the possibility that some subjects had the mistaken belief that, with high 
probability, their own sense of which of the three positions (left, right or bottom) was most 
salient would be shared by their co-players.  Such subjects might choose s1 or s2 in the belief 
that this was team-optimal, even though in fact it was not.  But if this were the case, one 
would expect that team-reasoning subjects would systematically favour whichever position 
they thought most salient.  We tested, for each subject separately, whether subjects’ choices 
in the eighteen games were distributed non-randomly over the three positions.  The null 
hypothesis of a random distribution was rejected for only nine of the 126 subjects (at 5 per 
cent significance in a two-sided chi-squared goodness of fit test).  It seems that few if any 
subjects considered the use of position as a means of coordination. 
3.2  Tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2 
The data relevant for tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2 are reported in Table 4. 
[Table 4 near here] 
                                                          
16 There are six such games (G2, G6, G9, G10, G13 and G16).  For all these games except G13, level-
k theory predicts that, when aggregated across players, s1 and s2 choices are equally probable, 
irrespective of the distribution of levels of reasoning (see Appendix 1, Table A1.1).   
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 A striking feature of these data is the wide variation in the proportion of s3 choices 
across games, ranging from 1.6 per cent in G2 to 96.8 per cent in G18.  In every game, this 
proportion is significantly different from the random-choice benchmark (in all but two cases, 
with p < 0.01).17  These differences are as predicted by Hypothesis 1 in eleven games (G4, 
G7, G9 and G11–G18), but are in the unpredicted direction in the other seven games.  They 
are as predicted by Hypothesis 2 in twelve games (G1, G2, G3, G5, G6 and G12–G18), but 
are in the unpredicted direction in the other six games.  There are two games (G8 and G10) 
for which both hypotheses are disconfirmed.  Thus, in line with the mixed results of previous 
studies and with our prior expectation, the pattern of observed deviations from the random-
choice benchmark cannot be adequately explained by either of the theories we are 
considering. 
3.3  Tests of Hypotheses 3.1–3.3 
Table 5 lists the fifteen pairs of games that are relevant for tests of Hypotheses 3.1–3.3.  For 
each pair, the table shows which hypothesis implies that the proportion of s3 choices 
increases as one moves from the first game in the pair to the second.  It also shows the level-k 
prediction of the change in the proportion of s3 choices (derived from Table 2).  The 
corresponding team-reasoning prediction is always ‘no change’.  In cases in which the level-k 
prediction is ‘no change’, the hypothesis that is being tested is a strict implication of the 
corresponding conjecture (since in these cases, an increase in the relative frequency of team 
reasoning would imply an increase in the proportion of s3 choices).  When the level-k 
prediction is ‘decrease’, the hypothesis that is being tested is stronger than the corresponding 
conjecture (since an increase in the relative frequency of team reasoning might be offset by 
the reduction in s3 choices by subjects who consistently use level-k reasoning); thus, 
confirmation of the hypothesis gives particularly strong support to the conjecture.  Of course, 
these fifteen tests are not independent of one another, but each test, considered in isolation, is 
a valid test of the relevant hypothesis.     
[Table 5 near here] 
                                                          
17 Our tests are two-tail tests of the null hypothesis that the probability that a randomly-selected player 
of the relevant game chooses s3 is 1/3.  One might reasonably argue that, for any given game, a game 
theorist who specifically proposes one of the two theories is entitled to use a one-tail test of the 
hypothesis that this probability differs from 1/3 in the direction predicted by the proposed theory.  
However, from the viewpoint of an observer who is not proposing any particular theory and simply 
looking for possible regularities, randomness is the natural null hypothesis, and two-tail tests are 
appropriate.  In fact, the results of our two-tail tests are so strong that one-tail tests are unnecessary.  
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 Conjectures 2 and 3 are very strongly supported by the data.  In each of the ten tests 
of Hypotheses 3.2 and 3.3, there is an increase in the proportion of s3 choices, consistent with 
the relevant conjecture.  In nine of these cases, the increase is statistically significant, always 
at the 1 per cent level; these include two cases in which level-k theory predicts a decrease.  In 
contrast, we do not find consistent support for Conjecture 1.  In the five tests of Hypothesis 
3.1, the conjectured increase in the proportion of s3 choices is observed in three cases, in two 
of which it is significant at the 1 per cent level, but there are significant decreases in the two 
other cases.   
 A comparison between behaviour in G9 and G10 may give further insight into the 
relationship between payoff inequality and team reasoning.  In each of these games, the s1, s2 
and s3 equilibria all give unequal payoffs and are not Pareto-comparable.  The difference 
between the two games concerns the degree of inequality.  In G9, the s3 equilibrium is less 
unequal than the others; in G10, it is more unequal.  Level-k theory implies that s3 is more 
likely to be chosen in G10 (see Table 2).  However, we observe a much higher proportion of 
s3 choices in G9 (69.0 per cent compared with 19.8 per cent, (McNemar’s chi=45.76, 
p<0.001).  This result suggests that team reasoning may be facilitated if the team-optimal 
equilibrium, although itself unequal, is less unequal than the other equilibria.    
3.4.  Regression analysis 
As a further attempt to identify patterns in the data, we estimate a random effect probit model 
with a binary dependent variable assuming value 1 if subject i chooses s3 in round t and 0 
otherwise.  Three regressors capture characteristics of the games which, according to 
Conjectures 1–3, can affect the probability of choosing s3: equality of payoffs in the team-
suboptimal equilibria (variable x equal to y), equality of payoffs in the team-optimal 
equilibrium (variable v equal to w), and having a team-optimal equilibrium that is Pareto-
dominated, ex post, by each of the two team-suboptimal equilibria (variable Pareto 
dominated).  Additional regressors capture other potentially relevant characteristics of games: 
having a team-optimal equilibrium that ex post Pareto-dominates each of the team-
suboptimal equilibria (variable Pareto dominating), playing the game as player P1 (variable 
Player P1), playing a game in which s3 is either in the left circle (variable s3 left) or in the 
right circle (variable s3 right), and the ratio between the average payoffs of the two team-
suboptimal equilibria and the payoffs of the team-optimal equilibrium (variable Average 
payoff ratio).  We control also for gender, age and nationality of subjects, the number of 
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previous experiments in which they have already participated, and the university course in 
which they are enrolled.  
 The results are reported in Table 6. 
[Table 6 near here] 
 This analysis provides support to each of the three conjectures.  Consistently with 
Conjectures 1 and 2, it is confirmed that, ceteris paribus, the probability of choosing s3 is 
positively affected by equality of payoffs in the team optimal equilibrium (variable v equal to 
w) and negatively affected by equality of payoffs in the suboptimal equilibria (variable x 
equal to y).  Consistently with Conjecture 3, this probability is lower in games in which the s3 
equilibrium is Pareto-dominated ex post by the other two equilibria than in games in which 
the equilibria are not Pareto-comparable (variable Pareto dominated). 
 Additionally, the probability of choosing s3 is greater in games in which the s3 
equilibrium Pareto-dominates the other two equilibria ex post than in games in which the 
equilibria are not Pareto-comparable (variable Pareto dominated); and Average payoff ratio 
has a strong and significant negative effect on the probability of choosing s3.  These effects 
might be evidence of further factors that affect players’ propensity to use team reasoning.  It 
would be plausible to conjecture that team reasoning is more likely when the team-optimal 
equilibrium is Pareto-dominant, and is also more likely, the higher the average payoff in the 
team-optimal equilibrium relative to that in the team-suboptimal equilibria.  However, the 
observed effect of Pareto-dominance is also an implication of level-k theory, and Average 
payoff ratio may simply be picking up a general tendency for players to favour strategies with 
high potential payoffs to themselves individually.  We also find a marginally significant 
negative effect of s3 being in the right circle.  The Player P1 variable has no significant 
effect, despite the fact that v > w in eleven of the eighteen games.  Thus, although payoff 
inequality in the team-optimal equilibrium inhibits team reasoning, there is no evidence that 
the strength of this effect differs between the two players. 
3.5.  Individual heterogeneity 
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Recall that there are nine games (G1–G7, G9 and G11) in which level-k and team reasoning 
have opposite implications about the choice of s3.
18  Across these games, there is extreme 
variation in proportion of s3 choices, ranging from 1.6 per cent in G2 to 88.9 per cent in G11.  
Clearly, the vast majority of subjects behaved in accordance with level-k theory in some of 
these games and in accordance with team reasoning in others.  In some of these games, 
however, there was considerable heterogeneity in individual behaviour.  It is therefore 
relevant to ask whether there is an individual-specific component to players’ propensities to 
use team reasoning and if so, how important that component is. 
 Given the patterns that we have found in our aggregate data, it would be surprising if 
there were no component of this kind.  We have identified certain general properties of games 
which tend to facilitate or inhibit team reasoning.  It would be natural to expect individuals to 
differ in their susceptibility to these factors.  Since our subjects were not selected to be a 
representative sample of any population, measures of the distribution of ‘susceptibility’ in the 
subject pool may not tell us much that is useful about the world outside the lab.  However, 
were we to find that subjects could be divided into discrete types, each with a sharply distinct 
mode of behaviour, that might provide useful clues for future research. 
 As a first step in screening the data, we construct a null hypothesis based on the 
extreme assumption that, in each game considered separately, the probability of choosing s3 
is the same for all players and is equal to the relative frequency observed in the experiment.  
Given this assumption, any observed heterogeneity of behaviour within any given game 
would be entirely due to random noise.  We then find the actual number of s3 choices made 
by each subject in the eighteen games of the experiment and examine the cumulative 
frequency distribution of these numbers.  We compare this observed distribution with the 
benchmark distribution implied by the null hypothesis, given the actual number of subjects in 
our sample. 
 Figure 2 plots the observed distribution and shows the 95 per cent confidence limits of 
the benchmark distribution.  It is clear from inspection that the two distributions are different: 
the observed distribution has more weight in the tails, indicating that (as one would expect) 
there is some individual heterogeneity.  Statistically, this difference is highly significant (2 
                                                          
18 Apart from one minor exception, level-k theory implies that s3 is never chosen by players at level L1 
or above in any of these games.  The exception is that in G5, P1 players at L1 are predicted to choose 
s3 with probability 1/3. 
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=195.35, p < 0.001).19  Nevertheless, the observed distribution is quite close to the 
benchmark distribution, with the same general S-shape, indicative of the absence of discrete 
subject types.20 
 [Figure 2 near here] 
 A similar analysis can be carried out separately for each of Conjectures 1, 2 and 3.  
Take the case of Conjecture 1.  There are five pairs of games, namely (G1, G2), (G3, 
G4), (G5, G6), (G8, G9) and (G8, G10), for which Conjecture 1 implies that we should find 
more s3 choices in the second game than in the first.  In any one of these pairs of games, a 
subject’s choices are in accordance with Conjecture 1 if she does not choose s3 in the first 
game but does so in the second.  We find the actual number of cases in which each subject 
behaves in accordance with Conjecture 1 and examine the cumulative frequency distribution 
of these numbers.  We compare this observed distribution with the benchmark distribution 
implied by the null hypothesis, given the actual number of subjects in our sample.  The 
results are shown in Figure 3a.  Corresponding results for Conjectures 2 and 3 are shown in 
Figures 3b and 3c. 
[Figures 3a, 3b and 3c near here] 
 In the case of Conjecture 1, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that observed 
heterogeneity is the result of random noise (2 =4.08, p = 0.395).  In the other two cases, 
there are significant differences between the observed and benchmark distributions (for 
Conjecture 2, 2 =14.91, p = 0.011; for Conjecture 3, 2 =14.98, p = 0.004).  The observed 
distributions have more weight in their tails than the benchmark distributions do, indicating 
some degree of individual heterogeneity.  Again, however, there is little indication of discrete 
subject types.21 
                                                          
19 The confidence limits shown in Figure 2 were derived by simulation.  For this, we generated 200 
distributions with n=126 by assigning to each hypothetical subject in each distribution a probability of 
choosing s3 in each game equal to the observed frequency of s3 choice in that particular game.  Our 
chi-squared tests compare the observed distribution of relative frequencies of ‘number of s3 choices’ 
with the benchmark distribution.   
20 The slight irregularity at high values of ‘number of s3 choices’ suggests the possibility that a small 
minority of subjects (less than 10 per cent) might belong to a discrete type that always uses team 
reasoning. 
21 A further method of screening for subject heterogeneity is to look for patterns in the correlation 
between proportions of s3 choices in pairs of games.  The matrix of correlation coefficients is reported 
in Appendix 5 [intended for online publication].  This matrix shows a general tendency for positive 
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3.6.   Learning 
It is also relevant to ask whether, over the course of the experiment, there was any significant 
trend in subjects’ propensities to act according to the theory of team reasoning.  Because the 
order in which games were played was randomized, it is sufficient to look for trends in the 
proportion of s3 choices.  In fact, there is no significant trend.  
4.  Discussion 
Our key findings concern cross-game variations in players’ propensities to choose s3 that are 
inconsistent both with the theory of team reasoning and with level-k theory.  Specifically, we 
find that the frequency of s3 choices is influenced by the extent of payoff inequality in the s1, 
s2 and s3 equilibria.  Equality of s3 payoffs and (possibly to a lesser extent) inequality of s1 
and s2 payoffs tend to induce more s3 choices.  In addition, s3 choices tend to be less frequent 
if, ex post, the payoffs in the s3 equilibrium are Pareto-dominated by those of other two 
equilibria than if the equilibria are not Pareto-comparable.   We have argued that these effects 
are consistent with plausible conjectures about the conditions under which players are more 
likely to use one or other of the two modes of reasoning we have considered.  Our provisional 
conclusion is that a satisfactory theory of behaviour in coordination games needs to include 
both collective optimality reasoning and bounded best response reasoning. 
 So far, however, we have shown only that the effects we have observed are 
inconsistent with the theory of team reasoning and with level-k theory.  Are we entitled to 
claim that this is true of the collective optimality approach in general and of bounded best 
response approach in general? 
 We need to consider a wide range of variant theories.  To keep the exposition 
uncluttered, we do not present the predictions of all these theories for all the games in the 
experiment.  Instead, we focus on four games, G1, G3, G7 and G11, which together 
encapsulate the problem of finding a single explanatory theory.  For all these games, team 
reasoning theory predicts the choice of s3, while level-k theory predicts that s3 will not be 
chosen at any level above L0.  The team reasoning prediction fails badly in G1 and G3, with 
                                                          
correlation, indicative of heterogeneity, but we do not discern any specific pattern to suggest that 
subjects can be divided into discrete types.   
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only 11.9 per cent and 13.5 per cent of players choosing s3; the level-k prediction is similarly 
unsuccessful in G7 and G11, where 69.0 per cent and 88.9 per cent of players chose s3.  
Similar failures of the two theories have been observed in previous experiments (see Section 
1.3 above). 
 First, we ask whether any variant of the bounded best response approach could 
explain the choice of s3 in G7 and G11.  Two obvious candidates are cognitive hierarchy 
theory and CGR’s ‘payoff and label salience’ specification of L0 behaviour (described in 
Section 1.2 above).  But consider the condition (Condition X) that x > v, w (that is, for each 
player, the better payoff from s1 or s2 is strictly greater than the payoff from s3).  Notice that 
Condition X holds for G7 and G11 (as it does for G1, G2, G3, G4, G6 and G9).  It is easy to 
see that, given Condition X, cognitive hierarchy theory replicates the level-k implication that 
s3 is not chosen by either player at any level above L0.   Under the same condition, s3 is 
payoff-dominated for both players.  Thus, even if s3 were label-salient, CGR’s tie-breaking 
rule would never make it the modal choice at L0 for either player, and so s3 would not be 
chosen at any level above L0.  Notice also that if Condition X holds, the implications of 
level-k theory are independent of attitudes to risk.   
 Another possibility is that players use level-k reasoning but are averse to inequality, as 
in the theories of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), with the result 
that utility payoffs differ from material ones.  But if inequality aversion is to induce L1 
reasoners (and thereby higher-level reasoners) to choose s3 in G7, we require that at least one 
player prefers the outcome in which both players receive a material payoff of 9 to the 
outcome in which she receives 10 and her co-player receives 9.  This would be an 
extraordinarily high degree of aversion to advantageous inequality, implying a preference for 
unilaterally burning one’s own money whenever one is better off than others – a possibility 
that Fehr and Schmidt rule out as ‘very implausible’ (p. 824). 
 More intuitively, it is hard to think of any plausible account of why players choose s3 
in G7 and G11 which does not refer to players’ perceptions of properties of strategy pairs as 
potential objects of coordination.  The most obvious explanations of this behaviour use one or 
both of two facts – that the s3 equilibrium is the only pure-strategy equilibrium with equal 
payoffs, and that, because of isomorphism, the s1 and s2 equilibria are not attainable.  But 
these are considerations that are relevant to players who are consciously trying to coordinate 
on some equilibrium, and not to players who are thinking only about best responses to one 
another’s given strategy choices.         
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 We now ask the opposite question: Is there any variant of the collective optimality 
approach that can explain why s3 is not chosen in G1 and G3?  Recall that our specification of 
team reasoning theory already allows for inequality aversion and risk aversion.  Within the 
collective optimality approach, the most obvious alternative to team reasoning is a theory 
which uses payoff dominance as a principle of equilibrium selection.  Because of the 
isomorphism between s1 and s2, the crucial issue in a payoff-dominance analysis is whether 
the pure-strategy s3 equilibrium gives higher expected utility to both players than the Nash 
equilibrium mix of s1 and s2.  In general, the Nash equilibrium mix of two isomorphic 
strategies can be different from the team-optimal mix, but this is not the case if, as in G1 and 
G3, both players are indifferent between the corresponding pure-strategy equilibria.  In order 
for s3 to be payoff-dominant in G1 and G3, it is sufficient that the certainty of eight units of 
material payoff is preferred to a lottery which gives ten units with probability 0.5 and zero 
otherwise.  This requires only that players are not extreme risk-seekers. 
 More intuitively, it seems obvious that if the s3 equilibrium is strictly Pareto-
dominated by both the other pure-strategy equilibria, any plausible theory of bounded best-
response reasoning will imply that players of G1 and G3 will not choose s3.  But this intuition 
cannot be carried over to collective-optimality reasoning unless players believe that one or 
other of the s1 and s2 equilibria is attainable.  As we showed in Section 3.1, our subjects’ use 
of the relative positions of the three circles is not consistent with their having that belief. 
 A final possibility (mentioned in Section 1.2 above) is that the population of players is 
a mixture of naïve and sophisticated team reasoners.  Consider a model in which naïve 
players do not recognise the difficulty of coordinating on one of two isomorphic equilibria, 
and simply choose any strategy associated with an equilibrium that is team-optimal ex post.  
Such players would choose s1 or s2 in G1 and G3.  Sophisticated players who attached a 
sufficiently high probability to their co-players being naïve would then avoid s3, despite its 
team-optimality.  A model of this kind could organise the main patterns in our data.  
However, as explained in Section 1.3, it would not explain the tendency, observed in other 
experiments, for conflicts of interest to reduce the power of focal points. 
5.  Conclusion 
Game theorists have proposed two very different ways of modelling players’ reasoning in 
coordination games.  One approach, exemplified by level-k theory, assumes boundedly 
rational best-response reasoning by individual players.  An alternative approach, exemplified 
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by the theory of team reasoning, assumes that players select strategies by using some 
criterion of collective optimality.  Previous authors have speculated that both approaches may 
play some role in explaining observed behaviour, but we believe that our paper is the first to 
translate these speculations into testable conjectures about which properties of coordination 
games facilitate or inhibit these two modes of reasoning and then to carry out the tests. 
 Our experimental results support the hypothesis that both modes of reasoning are used 
in coordination games, and that which mode is more likely to be used depends on the 
particular characteristics of the game being played.  Considered alongside the findings of 
previous experiments, our results suggest that a one-theory-fits-all approach is unlikely to 
provide a satisfactory explanation of behaviour in coordination games.  What is needed is a 
theory of how the mode of reasoning that players use is influenced by properties of the 
particular coordination game they are playing.  The conjectures we have proposed in this 
paper, and the supporting experimental evidence we have reported, are first steps in this 
enterprise.   
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Table 1: Games used in the experiment 
 
Payoff 
(in)equality 
s3 strictly Pareto-dominated 
y > v 
s3 weakly Pareto-dominated 
y = v and (x > y or v > w) 
s3 not Pareto-comparable 
v > y and x > w 
s3 weaklyPareto-dominating 
w = x and (x > y or v > w) 
s3 strictly Pareto-dominating 
w > x 
x = y, v > w G1= <(10,10), (10,10), (9,8)> G5= <(10,10), (10,10), (10,9)> G8= <(10,10), (10,10), (11,9)> G12= <(10,10), (10,10), (11,10)> G15= <(10,10), (10,10), (12,11)> 
x > y, v > w G2= <(10,9), (9,10), (8,7)> G6= <(10,9), (9,10), (9,8)> 
G9= <(12,9), (9,12), (11,10)> 
G10=<(11,10),(10,11),(12,9)> 
G13= <(10,9), (9,10), (11,10)> G16= <(10,9), (9,10), (12,11)> 
x = y, v = w G3= <(10,10), (10,10), (9,9)> n.a. n.a. n.a G17= <(10,10), (10,10), (11,11)> 
x > y, v = w G4= <(10,9), (9,10), (8,8)> G7= <(10,9), (9,10), (9,9)> G11= <(11,9), (9,11), (10,10)> G14= <(10,9), (9,10), (10,10)> G18= <(10,9), (9,10), (11,11)> 
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Table 2: Predicted proportions of s3 choices 
 
        Proportion of s3 choices predicted by: 
        _________________________________________________________________ 
        Team reasoning      Level-k theory for level and player:    
    L0  L1  L2  L3, L4, …. 
Game        P1 and P2  P1     P2 P1     P2 P1     P2 P1     P2 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
G1        1   1/3    1/3 0       0  0       0  0       0  
G2        1   1/3    1/3 0       0  0       0  0       0  
G3        1   1/3    1/3 0       0  0       0  0       0  
G4        1   1/3    1/3 0       0  0       0  0       0  
G5        1   1/3    1/3 1/3    0  0       0  0       0  
G6        1   1/3    1/3 0       0  0       0  0       0  
G7        1   1/3    1/3 0       0  0       0  0       0  
G8        1   1/3    1/3 1       0  0       1  1       0  
G9        1   1/3    1/3 0       0  0       0  0       0 
G10        1   1/3    1/3 1       0  0       1  1       0 
G11        1   1/3    1/3 0       0  0       0  0       0  
G12        1   1/3    1/3 1       1/3 1       1  1       1 
G13        1   1/3    1/3 1       1/2 1       1  1       1 
G14        1   1/3    1/3 1/2    1/2 1       1  1       1 
G15        1   1/3    1/3 1       1  1       1  1       1 
G16        1   1/3    1/3 1       1  1       1  1       1 
G17        1   1/3    1/3 1       1  1       1  1       1 
G18        1   1/3    1/3 1       1  1       1  1       1 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3:  Distribution of choices between s1 and s2 
 
 
  distribution of choices over (s1, s2) 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
  treatment A treatment B treatment C      all treatments 
game  (left, right) (bottom, left) (right, bottom)      (not reported if  
                  s1, s2 isomorphic) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
G1      (25, 12) ** (13, 25) * (17, 19)  
G2†  (21, 20)  (22, 19)  (19, 23)      (62, 62) 
G3     (21, 14)  (12, 24) * (24, 14)  
G4     (12, 10)  (10, 12)  (6, 21)*** 
G5      (27, 7)*** (16, 21)  (18, 18)  
G6†   (24, 15)  (17, 25)  (19, 19)      (60, 59) 
G7     (8, 8)  (5, 6)  (4, 8)   
G8      (26, 8)*** (10, 25)** (18, 17) 
G9†     (8, 6)  (5, 10)  (2, 5)      (15, 21) 
G10†  (21, 10)* (17, 19)  (14, 20)      (52, 49) 
G11    (2, 1)  (3, 3)  (2, 3) 
G12    (11, 5)  (11, 15)  (16, 6)*  
G13†  (2, 2)  (3, 4)  (0, 5)*      (5, 11) 
G14  (0, 0)  (0, 2)  (0, 1)  
G15  (7, 6)  (5, 5)  (9, 4) 
G16†  (2, 2)  (0, 3)  (4, 4)      (6, 9) 
G17  (1, 0)  (1, 2)  (0, 1) 
G18  (0, 1)  (0, 2)  (0, 1) 
 ____________________________________________________________________ 
Note:  Games in which s1 and s2 are non-isomorphic, allowing meaningful ‘all treatments’ 
tests, are marked by †.  The total number of subjects (including those who chose s3) in each 
treatment was 42. Asterisks report two-sided binomial tests of the hypothesis that s1 and s2 are 
chosen with equal probability; *, ** and *** denote rejection at 10, 5 and 1 per cent 
significance levels. 
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Table 4:  Observed percentages of s3 choices 
 
   
payoff      s3 strictly            s3 weakly                      s3 not Pareto- s3weakly Pareto-      s3 strictly 
(in)equality      Pareto-dominated      Pareto-dominated        comparable Pareto-dominating      Pareto-dominating 
      y>v            y = v and                      v > y and x > w w = x and                      w > x 
                                        (x > y or v > w)  (x > y or y > w) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
x = y, v > w      11.9# # # (G1)            15.1# # # (G5)          17.5# # # (G8) 49.2*** (G12)       71.4*** (G15) 
x > y, v > w      1.6# # # (G2)             5.6# # # (G6)          69.0*** (G9)  87.3*** (G13)       88.1*** (G16) 
                         19.8 # #   (G10) 
x = y, v = w      13.5# # # (G3)                                                                             96.0*** (G17) 
x > y, v = w      43.7** (G4)           69.0*** (G7)          88.9*** (G11) 97.6*** (G14)      96.8*** (G18) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note:  For all games, n = 126.  Asterisks and hashes report two-sided binomial tests of the null hypothesis that s3 is chosen with probability 
1/3. 
*, ** and *** denote rejection at 10, 5 and 1 per cent significance levels when observed proportion is greater than 1/3.  #, ## and ###  
denote rejection at 10, 5 and 1 per cent significance levels when observed proportion is less than  1/3. 
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Table 5:  Tests of Hypotheses 3.1–3.3    
    effect predicted      percentages of 
game pair test of      by level-k theory    s3 choices      2 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
G1, G2  Hypothesis 3.1 no change   (11.9, 1.6)  11.27### 
G3, G4  Hypothesis 3.1 no change   (13.5, 43.7)  28.88*** 
G5, G6  Hypothesis 3.1 decrease    (15.1, 5.6)  6.55## 
G8, G9  Hypothesis 3.1 decrease    (17.5, 69.0)  49.71*** 
G8, G10  Hypothesis 3.1 no change   (17.5, 19.8)  0.29 
 
G1, G3  Hypothesis 3.2 no change   (11.9, 13.5)  0.22 
G2, G4  Hypothesis 3.2 no change   (1.6, 43.7)  51.07*** 
G6, G7  Hypothesis 3.2 no change    (5.6, 69.0)  78.05*** 
G9, G11  Hypothesis 3.2 no change   (69.0, 88.9)  21.55*** 
G10, G11 Hypothesis 3.2 decrease    (19.8, 88.9)  76.45*** 
G13, G14 Hypothesis 3.2 decrease    (87.3, 97.6)  8.89*** 
 
G2, G9  Hypothesis 3.3 no change   (1.6, 69.0)  85.00*** 
G6, G9  Hypothesis 3.3 no change   (5.6, 69.0)  74.42*** 
G4, G11  Hypothesis 3.3 no change   (43.7, 88.9)  51.57*** 
G7, G11  Hypothesis 3.3 no change   (69.0, 88.9)  18.94** 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note:  2-statistics for McNemar test for paired s3 proportions.   *, ** and *** denote rejection at 10, 5 
and 1 per cent significance levels when observed effect is an increase.  #, ## and ### denote rejection at 
10, 5 and 1 per cent significance levels when observed effect is a decrease.  Paired t-tests on differences 
between s3 proportions give the same results.  
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Table 6: Regression analysis  
 Random effect probit 
coefficients 
(standard errors) 
Average marginal 
effects 
   
x equal to y –0.56*** 
(0.78) 
–0.13 
 
 
v equal to w 1.13*** 
(0.08) 
 
0.26 
 
Pareto dominating (βPDing ) 0.65*** 
(0.12) 
 
0.15 
 
Pareto dominated (βPDed )   –0.35*** 
(0.13) 
 
–0.81 
 
Player  P1 0.01 
(0.07) 
 
0.03 
 
s3  left –0.11 
(0.08) 
 
–0.02 
 
s3 right –0.17* 
(0.09) 
 
–0.04 
 
Average payoff  ratio –5.43*** 
(0.80) 
 
–1.24 
 
Experiments -0.01* 
(0.01) 
 
–0.003 
 
 
Economics 0.07 
(0.10) 
 
0.01 
 
Nationality 0.35* 
(0.18) 
 
0.08 
 
Gender –0.22** 
(0.10) 
 
–0.05 
 
Age –0.03 
(0.02) 
 
–0.007 
 
 
Constant 5.87 
(0.98) 
 
 
 
βPDing – βPDed 
           
                 1.00*** 
                (0.20) 
                    
                        
n= 1944; Log likelihood  = –823.02; Wald chi2=603.46 
The dependent variable takes value 1 if the choice is the one predicted by team reasoning (s3) theory and 0 otherwise.  
Player P1: dummy variable taking value 1 if the subject plays as P1;  x equal to y: dummy variable taking value 1 if 
the subject plays a game in which x=y; v equal to w: dummy variable taking value 1 if the subject plays a game in 
which v=w; Pareto dominated: dummy variable taking value  1 if the subject plays a game in which s3  is Pareto 
dominated (weakly or strongly) ex-post, by s1 and s2;  Pareto dominating : dummy variable taking value  1 if the 
subject plays a game in which s3  Pareto-dominates (weakly or strongly), ex-post, s1 and s2; s3 left:  dummy variable 
taking value  1 if the subject plays a game in which s3 is in the left circle; s3 right:  dummy variable taking value  1 
if the subject plays a game in which s3 is in the  right circle; Average payoff ratio: ratio between the average of P1’s 
and P2’s payoffs in s1 and the average of their payoffs in s3; Experiments: number of previous experiments the 
subjects has  participated in; Economics: dummy variable taking value 1 if the subject is enrolled in 
economics/management university courses; Nationality: dummy variable taking value 1 if the subject is Italian; 
Gender: dummy variable taking value 1 if the subject is female; Age: subject’s age. 
 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
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Figure 1: Payoff displays for a typical game (G2) 
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Figure 2: Relative frequency of number of s3 choices in games G1-G18 
 
 
The graph shows the cumulative relative frequency of the number of s3 choices in the 
eighteen games of the experiment.  The bars show the 95 per cent confidence limits of the 
benchmark distribution.  
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Figure 3:  Relative freqency of number of choices in accordance with 
Conjectures 1, 2 and 3 
a: Choices in accordance with Conjecture 1 
 
 
b:  Choices in accordance with Conjecture 2 
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c:  Choices in accordance with Conjecture 3  
 
In each panel the graph shows the cumulative relative frequency of the number of choices 
in accordance with the relevant conjecture.  The bars show the 95 per cent confidence 
limits of the benchmark distribution.  
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Appendix 1:  Predictions of level-k theory  
Table A1.1 shows the predictions of level-k theory for each of nine cases, defined by the 
relative values of the parameters v, w, x and y, under the assumption that L0 choices are 
uniformly random.  Although predictions are shown only for levels up to L3, the predictions 
for L4, L6, … are always the same as for L2 and those for L5, L7, … are always the same as 
for L3.  These cases are not exhaustive, but they include all our games G1–G18.  Given the 
assumption that L0 choices are random, and given the assumption that whenever two or more 
strategies have the same expected payoff they are chosen with equal probability, the 
derivation of the figures in the table is straightforward. 
 
Table A1.1:  Level-k predictions 
 
game(s)   player  proportion of choices that are (s1, s2, s3) 
     L0  L1  L2  L3 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Case1: x =y>v 
(G1, G3) 
   P1  (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) (1/2, 1/2, 0) (1/2, 1/2, 0) (1/2, 1/2, 0) 
   P2  (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) (1/2, 1/2, 0) (1/2, 1/2, 0) (1/2, 1/2, 0) 
Case 2: x>v, x >y 
(G2, G4, G6, G7,  
G9, G11) 
   P1  (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) (1, 0, 0)  (0, 1, 0)  (1, 0, 0) 
   P2  (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) (0, 1, 0)  (1, 0, 0)  (0, 1, 0) 
Case 3: x=y=v>w 
(G5) 
   P1  (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) (1/2, 1/2, 0) (1/2, 1/2, 0) 
   P2  (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) (1/2, 1/2, 0) (1/2, 1/2, 0) (1/2, 1/2, 0) 
 
Case 4: v>x =y >w 
(G8) 
   P1  (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) (0, 0, 1)  (1/2, 1/2, 0) (0, 0, 1) 
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   P2  (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) (1/2, 1/2, 0) (0, 0, 1)  (1/2, 1/2, 0) 
Case 5: v>x>y >w 
(G10) 
   P1  (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) (0, 0, 1)  (0, 1, 0)  (0, 0, 1)  
   P2  (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) (0, 1, 0)  (0, 0, 1)  (0, 1, 0) 
Case 6: v>x =w  =y 
(G12) 
   P1  (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) (0, 0, 1)  (0, 0, 1)  (0, 0, 1) 
   P2  (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) (0, 0, 1)  (0, 0, 1) 
Case 7: v>x =w >y 
(G13) 
   P1  (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) (0, 0, 1)  (0, 0, 1)  (0, 0, 1) 
   P2  (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) (0, 1/2, 1/2) (0, 0, 1)  (0, 0, 1) 
Case 8: x=v=w>y 
(G14) 
   P1  (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) (1/2, 0, 1/2) (0, 0, 1)  (0, 0, 1) 
   P2  (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) (0, 1/2, 1/2) (0, 0, 1)  (0, 0, 1) 
Case 9: v w>x 
(G15, G16, G17, G18) 
   P1  (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) (0, 0, 1)  (0, 0, 1)  (0, 0, 1) 
   P2  (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) (0, 0, 1)  (0, 0, 1)  (0, 0, 1) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 2:  Instructions 
 
 
 
Welcome to this experiment on decisional processes and thank you for 
participating in it. 
The experiment will last approximately 40 minutes. 
You will receive 3 euro for your participation. You can gain more money, 
depending on your choices and on choices of other participants. 
Your answers and your choices will be completely anonymous. The experimenters 
are not able to associate your choices and your answers to your name. 
We ask you to pay attention to the instructions that will appear on your screen. 
They will be read aloud by one of the experimenters. 
If you have any doubts or questions about anything related to the experiment raise 
your hand: one of the experimenters will come. 
Click on ‘continue’ to proceed. 
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During the experiment you will be asked to make choices. The main characteristics 
of the choices can be described through an example. 
First of all you will be matched with another person in this room. You will never 
know the identity or the other person, nor will he/she know your identity. 
On the screen of your computer will appear a figure similar to the one you are now 
seeing above. The numbers on the figure, which are only examples, represent the 
payments in euro for each combination of choices. 
Click on ‘continue’ to proceed. 
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You must choose one of the three options by clicking on one of the three circles on 
the figure. 
The person you are matched with must do the same. 
If your choice does not correspond to the choice of the other person, you will both 
get 0 euro. 
If both of you choose the same option, each of you will obtain the payment which 
is in the circle. 
Click on ‘continue’ to proceed. 
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So, if both of you choose the top left circle, you will get 7 euro and the other will 
get 8 euro. 
If both of you choose the top right circle, you will get 7 euro and the other will get 
7 euro. 
If both of you choose the bottom circle, you will obtain 10 euro and the other will 
get 7 euro. 
If you choose different circles, both of you will get 0 euro. 
Click on ‘continue’ to proceed. 
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The experiment. 
The experiment consists of 18 rounds. In each round you must make decisions on 
figures similar to the ones you have seen before. 
At the beginning of each round you will be matched with a person, and you will 
see a figure with different payments. 
Notice that in each round you will be matched with a different person. 
As in the previous example, if you and the other person choose the same circle, 
you will get the corresponding amount. If you and the other person choose a 
different circle the payment will be 0 euro. 
At the end of each round you will not receive any feedback on the results. 
At the end of the experiment, one of the rounds will be randomly selected, and you 
will receive the corresponding payment associated to that round. 
In particular before starting the experiment one participant will draw a ticket from 
a box containing 18 tickets numbered from 1 to 18. 
The ticket (without being opened) will be given to the experimenter. 
At the end of the experiment you will know the selected round. 
Click on ‘continue’ to proceed. 
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At the beginning of each round the figure with three circles will be shown. 
Before making your choice you must wait for 20 seconds. 
In order to select a choice it is sufficient to click on the selected circle. If you want 
to change your choice, you must click again on the selected choice in order to 
deselect it, then you can click on the other choice. 
When your decision is definitive you must click on the ‘ok’ button, in order to go 
to the following round. 
Click on ‘continue’ to proceed. 
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Before starting the experiment, you will participate in a trial session with 3 rounds. 
In each round you will be asked to choose an option and to answer a question, 
which is on the sheet on your table. 
The choices made in this session will not affect your final payment. 
At the end of this session we shall correct the questions and we shall clarify any 
doubts. After that we shall proceed with the experiment. 
Click on ‘continue’ to proceed. 
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Appendix 3: Matching procedure 
The following tables report the details of the procedure used to match subjects and to define the sequences of games played by each subject in the 18 rounds. We 
start with the procedure used in SESSION 1.  Columns 1-18 are subjects, rows 1-18 are rounds.  The entry in each cell is the number of the game (G1–G18) that is 
played by the relevant subject in the relevant round.  In each game, in each round, one subject from 1to 9 is paired with one from 10 to 18. 
STEP 1: 
We  assigned games 1 – 18 to player 10, using a random sequence  : 
round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1          11 
2          8 
3          1  
4          3 
5          6 
6          17 
7          4 
8          10 
9          7 
10          16 
11          14 
12          12 
13          15 
14          18 
15          5 
16          13 
17          9          
18          2 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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STEP 2: 
We used the same random sequence to assign games to players 11-18 (with a shift for each column): 
  
round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1          11 2 9 13 5 18 15 12 14 
2          8 11 2 9 13 5 18 15 12 
3          1 8 11 2 9 13 5 18 15 
4          3 1 8 11 2 9 13 5 18 
5          6 3 1 8 11 2 9 13 5 
6          17 6 3 1 8 11 2 9 13 
7          4 17 6 3 1 8 11 2 9 
8          10 4 17 6 3 1 8 11 2 
9          7 10 4 17 6 3 1 8 11 
10          16 7 10 4 17 6 3 1 8 
11          14 16 7 10 4 17 6 3 1 
12          12 14 16 7 10 4 17 6 3  
13          15 12 14 16 7 10 4 17 6 
14          18 15 12 14 16 7 10 4 17 
15          5 18 15 12 14 16 7 10 4 
16          13 5 18 15 12 14 16 7 10 
17          9 13 5 18 15 12 14 16 7  
18          2 9 13 5 18 15 12 14 16 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
55 
 
 
STEP  3:  
Using the original sequence we filled in a diagonal for opponents (from players 1 to 9) for player 10: 
  
round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1 11         11 2 9 13 5 18 15 12 14 
2  8        8 11 2 9 13 5 18 15 12 
3   1       1 8 11 2 9 13 5 18 15 
4    3      3 1 8 11 2 9 13 5 18 
5     6     6 3 1 8 11 2 9 13 5 
6      17    17 6 3 1 8 11 2 9 13 
7       4   4 17 6 3 1 8 11 2 9 
8        10  10 4 17 6 3 1 8 11 2 
9         7 7 10 4 17 6 3 1 8 11 
10 16         16 7 10 4 17 6 3 1 8 
11  14        14 16 7 10 4 17 6 3 1 
12   12       12 14 16 7 10 4 17 6 3  
13    15      15 12 14 16 7 10 4 17 6 
14     18     18 15 12 14 16 7 10 4 17 
15      5    5 18 15 12 14 16 7 10 4 
16       13   13 5 18 15 12 14 16 7 10 
17        9  9 13 5 18 15 12 14 16 7  
18         2 2 9 13 5 18 15 12 14 16 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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STEP 4: 
We repeated step 3 for opponents of player 11 - 18: 
  
round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1 11 2 9 13 5 18 15 12 14 11 2 9 13 5 18 15 12 14 
2 12 8 11 2 9 13 5 18 15 8 11 2 9 13 5 18 15 12 
3 18 15 1 8 11 2 9 13 5 1 8 11 2 9 13 5 18 15 
4 13 5 18 3 1 8 11 2 9 3 1 8 11 2 9 13 5 18 
5 2 9 13 5 6 3 1 8 11 6 3 1 8 11 2 9 13 5 
6 8 11 2 9 13 17 6 3 1 17 6 3 1 8 11 2 9 13 
7 3 1 8 11 2 9 4 17 6 4 17 6 3 1 8 11 2 9 
8 17 6 3 1 8 11 2 10 4 10 4 17 6 3 1 8 11 2 
9 10 4 17 6 3 1 8 11 7 7 10 4 17 6 3 1 8 11 
10 16 7 10 4 17 6 3 1 8 16 7 10 4 17 6 3 1 8 
11 1 14 16 7 10 4 17 6 3 14 16 7 10 4 17 6 3 1 
12 6 3 12 14 16 7 10 4 17 12 14 16 7 10 4 17 6 3  
13 4 17 6 15 12 14 16 7 10 15 12 14 16 7 10 4 17 6 
14 7 10 4 17 18 15 12 14 16 18 15 12 14 16 7 10 4 17 
15 14 16 7 10 4 5 18 15 12 5 18 15 12 14 16 7 10 4 
16 15 12 14 16 7 10 13 5 18 13 5 18 15 12 14 16 7 10 
17 5 18 15 12 14 16 7 9 13 9 13 5 18 15 12 14 16 7  
18 9 13 5 18 15 12 14 16 2 2 9 13 5 18 15 12 14 16 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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STEP 5: 
We assigned the games to the three treatments. Each game is played three times, by three different pairs, in each treatment.  
Treatment - A, B or C - is in parentheses. 
  
round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1 11(A) 2(A) 9(A) 13(A) 5(A) 18(A) 15(A) 12(A) 14(A) 11(A) 2(A) 9(A) 13(A) 5(A) 18(A) 15(A) 12(A) 14(A) 
2 12(B) 8(B) 11(B) 2(B) 9(B) 13(B) 5(B) 18(B) 15(B) 8(B) 11(B) 2(B) 9(B) 13(B) 5(B) 18(B) 15(B) 12(B) 
3 18(C) 15(C) 1(C) 8(C) 11(C) 2(C) 9(C) 13(C) 5(C) 1(C) 8(C) 11(C) 2(C) 9(C) 13(C) 5(C) 18(C) 15(C) 
4 13(A) 5(A) 18(A) 3(A) 1(A) 8(A) 11(A) 2(A) 9(A) 3(A) 1(A) 8(A) 11(A) 2(A) 9(A) 13(A) 5(A) 18(A) 
5 2(B) 9(B) 13(B) 5(B) 6(B) 3(B) 1(B) 8(B) 11(B) 6(B) 3(B) 1(B) 8(B) 11(B) 2(B) 9(B) 13(B) 5(B) 
6 8(C) 11(C) 2(C) 9(C) 13(C) 17(C) 6(C) 3(C) 1(C) 17(C) 6(C) 3(C) 1(C) 8(C) 11(C) 2(C) 9(C) 13(C) 
7 3(A) 1(A) 8(A) 11(A) 2(A) 9(A) 4(A) 17(A) 6(A) 4(A) 17(A) 6(A) 3(A) 1(A) 8(A) 11(A) 2(A) 9(A) 
8 17(B) 6(B) 3(B) 1(B) 8(B) 11(B) 2(B) 10(B) 4(B) 10(B) 4(B) 17(B) 6(B) 3(B) 1(B) 8(B) 11(B) 2(B) 
9 10(C) 4(C) 17(C) 6(C) 3(C) 1(C) 8(C) 11(C) 7(C) 7(C) 10(C) 4(C) 17(C) 6(C) 3(C) 1(C) 8(C) 11(C) 
10 16(A) 7(A) 10(A) 4(A) 17(A) 6(A) 3(A) 1(A) 8(A) 16(A) 7(A) 10(A) 4(A) 17(A) 6(A) 3(A) 1(A) 8(A) 
11 1(B) 14(B) 16(B) 7(B) 10(B) 4(B) 17(B) 6(B) 3(B) 14(B) 16(B) 7(B) 10(B) 4(B) 17(B) 6(B) 3(B) 1(B) 
12 6(C) 3(C) 12(C) 14(C) 16(C) 7(C) 10(C) 4(C) 17(C) 12(C) 14(C) 16(C) 7(C) 10(C) 4(C) 17(C) 6(C) 3(C)  
13 4(A) 17(A) 6(A) 15(A) 12(A) 14(A) 16(A) 7(A) 10(A) 15(A) 12(A) 14(A) 16(A) 7(A) 10(A) 4(A) 17(A) 6(A) 
14 7(B) 10(B) 4(B) 17(B) 18(B) 15(B) 12(B) 14(B) 16(B) 18(B) 15(B) 12(B) 14(B) 16(B) 7(B) 10(B) 4(B) 17(B) 
15 14(C) 16(C) 7(C) 10(C) 4(C) 5(C) 18(C) 15(C) 12(C) 5(C)  18(C) 15(C) 12(C) 14(C) 16(C) 7(C) 10(C) 4(C) 
16 15(A) 12(A) 14(A) 16(A) 7(A) 10(A) 13(A) 5(A) 18(A) 13(A) 5(A) 18(A) 15(A) 12(A) 14(A) 16(A) 7(A) 10(A) 
17 5(B)  18(B) 15(B) 12(B) 14(B) 16(B) 7(B) 9(B) 13(B) 9(B) 13(B) 5(B) 18(B) 15(B) 12(B) 14(B) 16(B) 7(B)  
18 9(C) 13(C) 5(C) 18(C) 15(C) 12(C) 14(C) 16(C) 2(C) 2(C) 9(C) 13(C) 5(C) 18(C) 15(C) 12(C) 14(C) 16(C) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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STEP 6: 
Subjects' roles were randomly assigned.  
* = P1 
  
round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1 11(A) 2(A) 9(A) 13(A) 5(A) 18(A) 15(A) 12(A) 14(A) 11(A)* 2(A)* 9(A)* 13(A)* 5(A)* 18(A)* 15(A)* 12(A)* 14(A)* 
2 12(B) 8(B) 11(B) 2(B) 9(B) 13(B) 5(B) 18(B) 15(B) 8(B)* 11(B)* 2(B)* 9(B)* 13(B)* 5(B)* 18(B)* 15(B)* 12(B)* 
3 18(C)* 15(C)* 1(C)* 8(C)* 11(C)* 2(C)* 9(C)* 13(C)* 5(C)* 1(C) 8(C) 11(C) 2(C) 9(C) 13(C) 5(C) 18(C) 15(C) 
4 13(A) 5(A) 18(A) 3(A) 1(A) 8(A) 11(A) 2(A) 9(A) 3(A)* 1(A)* 8(A)* 11(A)* 2(A)* 9(A)* 13(A)* 5(A)* 18(A)* 
5 2(B) 9(B) 13(B) 5(B) 6(B) 3(B) 1(B) 8(B) 11(B) 6(B)* 3(B)* 1(B)* 8(B)* 11(B)* 2(B)* 9(B)* 13(B)* 5(B)* 
6 8(C)* 11(C)* 2(C)* 9(C)* 13(C)* 17(C)* 6(C)* 3(C)* 1(C)* 17(C) 6(C) 3(C) 1(C) 8(C) 11(C) 2(C) 9(C) 13(C) 
7 3(A)* 1(A)* 8(A)* 11(A)* 2(A)* 9(A)* 4(A)* 17(A)* 6(A)* 4(A) 17(A) 6(A) 3(A) 1(A) 8(A) 11(A) 2(A) 9(A) 
8 17(B)* 6(B)* 3(B)* 1(B)* 8(B)* 11(B)* 2(B)* 10(B)* 4(B)* 10(B) 4(B) 17(B) 6(B) 3(B) 1(B) 8(B) 11(B) 2(B) 
9 10(C) 4(C) 17(C) 6(C) 3(C) 1(C) 8(C) 11(C) 7(C) 7(C)* 10(C)* 4(C)* 17(C)* 6(C)* 3(C)* 1(C)* 8(C)* 11(C)* 
10 16(A)* 7(A)* 10(A)* 4(A)* 17(A)* 6(A)* 3(A)* 1(A)* 8(A)* 16(A) 7(A) 10(A) 4(A) 17(A) 6(A) 3(A) 1(A) 8(A) 
11 1(B)* 14(B)* 16(B)* 7(B)* 10(B)* 4(B)* 17(B)* 6(B)* 3(B)* 14(B) 16(B) 7(B) 10(B) 4(B) 17(B) 6(B) 3(B) 1(B) 
12 6(C) 3(C) 12(C) 14(C) 16(C) 7(C) 10(C) 4(C) 17(C) 12(C)* 14(C)* 16(C)* 7(C)* 10(C)* 4(C)* 17(C)* 6(C)* 3(C)*  
13 4(A)* 17(A)* 6(A)* 15(A)* 12(A)* 14(A)* 16(A)* 7(A)* 10(A)* 15(A) 12(A) 14(A) 16(A) 7(A) 10(A) 4(A) 17(A) 6(A) 
14 7(B) 10(B) 4(B) 17(B) 18(B) 15(B) 12(B) 14(B) 16(B) 18(B)* 15(B)* 12(B)* 14(B)* 16(B)* 7(B)* 10(B)* 4(B)* 17(B)* 
15 14(C)* 16(C)* 7(C)* 10(C)* 4(C)* 5(C)* 18(C)* 15(C)* 12(C)* 5(C)  18(C) 15(C) 12(C) 14(C) 16(C) 7(C) 10(C) 4(C) 
16 15(A)* 12(A)* 14(A)* 16(A)* 7(A)* 10(A)* 13(A)* 5(A)* 18(A)* 13(A) 5(A) 18(A) 15(A) 12(A) 14(A) 16(A) 7(A) 10(A) 
17 5(B)  18(B) 15(B) 12(B) 14(B) 16(B) 7(B) 9(B) 13(B) 9(B)* 13(B)* 5(B)* 18(B)* 15(B)* 12(B)* 14(B)* 16(B)* 7(B)*  
18 9(C) 13(C) 5(C) 18(C) 15(C) 12(C) 14(C) 16(C) 2(C) 2(C)* 9(C)* 13(C)* 5(C)* 18(C)* 15(C)* 12(C)* 14(C)* 16(C)* 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Example 
In SESSION 1, subject 1 in round 16 plays game G15, with the display of treatment A, as player P1, and she is paired with subject 13.  In round 12 she plays game 
G6, with the display of treatment C, as player P2, and she is paired with subject 17 (see step 6 table). 
In each of the other six sessions we randomized the positions of the rows keeping the distribution of treatments across rows (for example, see the final table for 
session 2 below). 
This matching structure is characterized by the following desirable features: 
1. Each game is played 9 times, in 9 different rounds. 
2.  Each subject plays all 18 games. 
3.  Each subject plays 2 games against each of 9 different opponents. 
4.  The order in which games are played is different for each subject.  
5.  The order in which subject play as P1 or P2 is randomized. 
6.  Each player plays 6 games in each display. 
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Matching structure used in SESSION 2 (original position of the row is in brackets) 
  
round   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1 [3]  18(A)* 15(A)* 1(A)* 8(A)* 11(A)* 2(A)* 9(A)* 13(A)* 5(A)* 1(A) 8(A) 11(A) 2(A) 9(A) 13(A) 5(A) 18(A) 15(A) 
2 [18]  9(B) 13(B) 5(B) 18(B) 15(B) 12(B) 14(B) 16(B) 2(B) 2(B)* 9(B)* 13(B)* 5(B)* 18(B)* 15(B)* 12(B)* 14(B)* 16(B)* 
3 [4]  13(C) 5(C) 18(C) 3(C) 1(C) 8(C) 11(C) 2(C) 9(C) 3(C)* 1(C)* 8(C)* 11(C)* 2(C)* 9(C)* 13(C)* 5(C)* 18(C)* 
4 [7]  3(A)* 1(A)* 8(A)* 11(A)* 2(A)* 9(A)* 4(A)* 17(A)* 6(A)* 4(A) 17(A) 6(A) 3(A) 1(A) 8(A) 11(A) 2(A) 9(A) 
5 [15]  14(B)* 16(B)* 7(B)* 10(B)* 4(B)* 5(B)* 18(B)* 15(B)* 12(B)* 5(B)  18(B) 15(B) 12(B) 14(B) 16(B) 7(B) 10(B) 4(B) 
6 [5]  2(C) 9(C) 13(C) 5(C) 6(C) 3(C) 1(C) 8(C) 11(C) 6(C)* 3(C)* 1(C)* 8(C)* 11(C)* 2(C)* 9(C)* 13(C)* 5(C)* 
7 [9]  10(A) 4(A) 17(A) 6(A) 3(A) 1(A) 8(A) 11(A) 7(A) 7(A)* 10(A)* 4(A)* 17(A)* 6(A)* 3(A)* 1(A)* 8(A)* 11(A)* 
8 [2]  12(B) 8(B) 11(B) 2(B) 9(B) 13(B) 5(B) 18(B) 15(B) 8(B)* 11(B)* 2(B)* 9(B)* 13(B)* 5(B)* 18(B)* 15(B)* 12(B)* 
9 [17]  5(C)  18(C) 15(C) 12(C) 14(C) 16(C) 7(C) 9(C) 13(C) 9(C)* 13(C)* 5(C)* 18(C)* 15(C)* 12(C)* 14(C)* 16(C)* 7(C)* 
10 [8]  17(A)* 6(A)* 3(A)* 1(A)* 8(A)* 11(A)* 2(A)* 10(A)* 4(A)* 10(A) 4(A) 17(A) 6(A) 3(A) 1(A) 8(A) 11(A) 2(A) 
11 [1]   11(B) 2(B) 9(B) 13(B) 5(B) 18(B) 15(B) 12(B) 14(B) 11(B)* 2(B)* 9(B)* 13(B)* 5(B)* 18(B)* 15(B)* 12(B)* 14(B)* 
12 [12]   6(C) 3(C) 12(C) 14(C) 16(C) 7(C) 10(C) 4(C) 17(C) 12(C)* 14(C)* 16(C)* 7(C)* 10(C)* 4(C)* 17(C)* 6(C)* 3(C)* 
13 [16]  15(A)* 12(A)* 14(A)* 16(A)* 7(A)* 10(A)* 13(A)* 5(A)* 18(A)* 13(A) 5(A) 18(A) 15(A) 12(A) 14(A) 16(A) 7(A) 10(A) 
14 [11]   1(B)* 14(B)* 16(B)* 7(B)* 10(B)* 4(B)* 17(B)* 6(B)* 3(B)* 14(B) 16(B) 7(B) 10(B) 4(B) 17(B) 6(B) 3(B) 1(B) 
15 [13]   4(C)* 17(C)* 6(C)* 15(C)* 12(C)* 14(C)* 16(C)* 7(C)* 10(C)* 15(C) 12(C) 14(C) 16(C) 7(C) 10(C) 4(C) 17(C) 6(C) 
16 [10]  16(A)* 7(A)* 10(A)* 4(A)* 17(A)* 6(A)* 3(A)* 1(A)* 8(A)* 16(A) 7(A) 10(A) 4(A) 17(A) 6(A) 3(A) 1(A) 8(A) 
17 [6]  8 (B)* 11(B)* 2(B)* 9(B)* 13(B)* 17(B)* 6(B)* 3(B)* 1(B)* 17(B) 6(B) 3(B) 1(B) 8(B) 11(B) 2(B) 9(B) 13(B) 
18 [14]  7(C) 10(C) 4(C) 17(C) 18(C) 15(C) 12(C) 14(C) 16(C) 18(C)* 15(C)* 12(C)* 14(C)* 16(C)* 7(C)* 10(C)* 4(C)* 17(C)* 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 4:  Full results of experiment 
The full results are shown in Table A4.1 below.  For each game G1 to G18, there is a panel 
reporting the frequencies of the choices made by the 126 subjects, disaggregated by player 
role (P1 or P2) and treatment (A, B or C).  Choices are classified according to whether the 
chosen strategy was displayed in the left (L), right (R) or bottom (B) circle.  In each panel, at 
the top of each ‘treatment’ column, the payoffs of the three pure strategy equilibria are shown 
in the order L, R, B.  In all cases, the cell that reports the frequency of s3 choices (i.e. the 
choice predicted by the theory of team reasoning) is shaded grey.   
 For example, consider game G2, in which the payoffs were x = 10, y = 9, v = 8, w = 7.  
In Treatment A, the left, right and bottom circles respectively displayed the s1, s2 and s3 
equilibria.  This is represented as <(10, 9), (9, 10), (8, 7)>.  Of the 21 subjects in the P1 role in 
this treatment, 10 chose L (i.e. s1), 10 chose R (i.e. s2), and 1 chose B (i.e. s3).  Of the 21 
subjects in the P2 role in this treatment, 11 chose L (i.e. s1), 10 chose R (i.e. s2), and 0 chose B 
(i.e. s3).  In Treatment B, the left, right and bottom circles respectively displayed the s2, s3 and 
s1 equilibria.  This is represented as <(9, 10), (8, 7), (10, 9)>.  Of the 21 subjects in the P1 role 
in this treatment, 11 chose L (i.e. s1), 0 chose R (i.e. s2), and 10 chose B (i.e. s3).  And so on.  
 At the bottom of each panel, the ‘coordination rate’ is reported for each treatment.  
This is the number of pairs of co-players in which both players chose the same circle, 
expressed as a percentage of the 21 pairs. 
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  Table A4.1:  Choice frequencies 
(Shaded cells show s3 choices.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GAME G1 GAME G2
Treatment A Treatment B Treatment C Treatment A Treatment B Treatment C
<(10,10), (10,10), (9,8)> <(10,10),(9,8), (10,10)> <(9,8),(10,10),(10,10)> <(10,9), (9,10), (8,7)> <(9,10),(8,7), (10,9)> <(8,7),(10,9),(9,10) >
L 15 13 3 L 10 11 0
P1 R 4 4 7 P1 R 10 0 8
B 2 4 11 B 1 10 13
TOT 21 21 21 TOT 21 21 21
L 10 12 3 L 11 8 0
P2 R 8 0 10 P2 R 10 1 11
B 3 9 8 B 0 12 10
TOT 21 21 21 TOT 21 21 21
Coord. Rate (%) Coord. Rate (%) 
38.1 33.3 38.1 38.1 47.6 38.1
GAME G3 GAME G4
Treatment A Treatment B Treatment C Treatment A Treatment B Treatment C
<(10,10), (10,10), (9,9)> <(10,10),(9,9), (10,10)> <(9,9),(10,10),(10,10) > <(10,9), (9,10), (8,8)> <(9,10),(8,8), (10,9)> <(8,8),(10,9),(9,10) >
L 10 14 2 L 7 5 5
P1 R 6 2 10 P1 R 6 13 3
B 5 5 9 B 8 3 13
TOT 21 21 21 TOT 21 21 21
L 11 10 2 L 5 7 10
P2 R 8 4 14 P2 R 4 7 3
B 2 7 5 B 12 7 8
TOT 21 21 21 TOT 21 21 21
Coord. Rate (%) Coord. Rate (%)
52.4 38.1 52.4 28.6 23.8 47.6
GAME G5 GAME G6
Treatment A Treatment B Treatment C Treatment A Treatment B Treatment C
<(10,10), (10,10), (10,9)> <(10,10),(10,9), (10,10)> <(10,9),(10,10),(10,10)> <(10,9), (9,10), (9,8)> <(9,10),(9,8), (10,9)> <(9,8),(10,9),(9,10)>
L 12 11 4 L 9 14 3
P1 R 5 1 8 P1 R 9 0 8
B 4 9 9 B 3 7 10
TOT 21 21 21 TOT 21 21 21
L 15 10 2 L 15 11 1
P2 R 2 4 10 P2 R 6 0 11
B 4 7 9 B 0 10 9
TOT 21 21 21 TOT 21 21 21
Coord. Rate (%) Coord. Rate (%)
47.6 38.1 33.3 52.3 57.1 61.9
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GAME G7 GAME G8
Treatment A Treatment B Treatment C Treatment A Treatment B Treatment C
<(10,9), (9,10), (9,9)> <(9,10),(9,9), (10,9)> <(9,9),(10,9),(9,10)> <(10,10), (10,10), (11,9)> <(10,10),(11,9), (10,10)> <(11,9),(10,10),(10,10)>
L 3 3 12 L 11 12 4
P1 R 3 16 3 P1 R 4 2 8
B 15 2 6 B 6 7 9
TOT 21 21 21 TOT 21 21 21
L 5 3 18 L 15 13 3
P2 R 5 15 1 P2 R 4 5 10
B 11 3 2 B 2 3 8
TOT 21 21 21 TOT 21 21 21
Coord. Rate (%) Coord. Rate (%)
33.3 66.6 57.1 38.1 38.1 52.3
GAME G9 GAME G10
Treatment A Treatment B Treatment C Treatment A Treatment B Treatment C
<(12,9), (9,12), (11,10)> <(9,12), (11,10), (12,9)> <(11,10), (12,9), (9,12)> <(11,10), (10,11), (12,9)> <(10,11), (12,9), (11,10)> <(12,9), (11,10), (10,11)>
L 4 5 17 L 7 14 3
P1 R 2 13 1 P1 R 8 1 4
B 15 3 3 B 6 6 14
TOT 21 21 21 TOT 21 21 21
L 4 5 15 L 14 5 5
P2 R 4 14 1 P2 R 2 5 10
B 13 2 5 B 5 11 6
TOT 21 21 21 TOT 21 21 21
Coord. Rate (%) Coord. Rate (%)
57.1 57.1 61.9 57.1 23.8 38
GAME G11 GAME G12
Treatment A Treatment B Treatment C Treatment A Treatment B Treatment C
<(11,9), (9,11), (10,10)> <(9,11), (10,10), (11,9)> <(10,10), (11,9), (9,11)> <(10,10), (10,10), (11,10)> <(10,10), (11,10), (10,10)> <(11,10), (10,10), (10,10)>
L 2 0 19 L 8 9 9
P1 R 0 19 1 P1 R 1 9 8
B 19 2 1 B 12 3 4
TOT 21 21 21 TOT 21 21 21
L 0 3 18 L 3 6 11
P2 R 1 17 1 P2 R 4 7 8
B 20 1 2 B 14 8 2
TOT 21 21 21 TOT 21 21 21
Coord. Rate (%) Coord. Rate (%)
85.7 71.4 85.7 57.1 19 33.3
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GAME G13 GAME G14
Treat.A Treat.B Treat.C Treat.A Treat.B Treat.C
<(10,9), (9,10), (11,10)> <(9,10), (11,10), (10,9)> <(11,10), (10,9), (9,10)> <(10,9), (9,10), (10,10)> <(9,10), (10,10), (10,9)> <(10,10), (10,9), (9,10)>
L 0 1 16 L 0 1 21
P1 R 1 18 0 P1 R 0 20 0
B 20 2 5 B 21 0 0
TOT 21 21 21 TOT 21 21 21
L 2 3 21 L 0 1 20
P2 R 1 17 0 P2 R 0 20 0
B 18 1 0 B 21 0 1
TOT 21 21 21 TOT 21 21 21
Coord. Rate (%) Coord. Rate (%)
80.9 71.4 76.2 100 90.5 95.2
GAME G15 GAME G16
Treat.A Treat.B Treat.C Treat.A Treat.B Treat.C
<(10,10), (10,10), (12,11)> <(10,10), (12,11), (10,10)> <(12,11), (10,10), (10,10)> <(10,9), (9,10), (12,11)> <(9,10), (12,11), (10,9)> <(12,11), (10,9), (9,10)>
L 4 2 18 L 1 2 15
P1 R 2 18 2 P1 R 1 19 3
B 15 1 1 B 19 0 3
TOT 21 21 21 TOT 21 21 21
L 3 3 11 L 1 1 19
P2 R 4 14 7 P2 R 1 20 1
B 14 4 3 B 19 0 1
TOT 21 21 21 TOT 21 21 21
Coord. Rate (%) Coord. Rate (%)
53.2 61.9 61.9 90.5 85.7 61.9
GAME G17 GAME G18
Treatment A Treatment B Treatment C Treatment A Treatment B Treatment C
<(10,10), (10,10), (11,11)> <(10,10), (11,11), (10,10)> <(11,11), (10,10), (10,10)> <(10,9), (9,10), (11,11)> <(9,10), (11,11), (10,9)> <(11,11), (10,9), (9,10)>
L 1 2 21 L 0 0 21
P1 R 0 19 0 P1 R 0 21 0
B 20 0 0 B 21 0 0
TOT 21 21 21 TOT 21 21 21
L 0 0 20 L 0 2 20
P2 R 0 20 0 P2 R 1 19 0
B 21 1 1 B 20 0 1
TOT 21 21 21 TOT 21 21 21
Coord. Rate (%) Coord. Rate (%)
95.2 90.5 95.2 95.2 90.5 95.2
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Appendix 5: Correlation between s3 choices in each pair of games 
 
  G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 G8 G9 G10 G11 G12 G13 G14 G15 G16 G17 G18 
G1                                     
G2 0.1494*                                   
G3 0.357*** 0.136                                 
G4 -0.027 0.016 0.1677*                               
G5 0.529*** -0.054 0.483*** -0.013                             
G6 0.125 0.246*** 0.310*** 0.205** 0.091                           
G7 0.034 0.085 0.063 0.451*** 0.042 0.087                         
G8 0.412*** 0.276*** 0.369*** -0.025 0.390*** 0.253*** 0.082                       
G9 -0.125 0.085 -0.037 0.070 -0.102 -0.063 0.109 -0.144                     
G10 0.002 0.096 0.037 0.004 0.013 0.314*** -0.097 0.190** -0.140***                   
G11 -0.026 0.045 -0.008 0.158* -0.133 0.086 0.309*** -0.170* 0.418*** -.204**                 
G12 0.177** 0.129 0.2154** -0.322*** 0.250*** 0.108 -0.199** 0.341*** 0.247 0.028 -0.006               
G13 0.067 0.048 0.011 -0.049 -0.039 0.093 -0.101 0.113 0.054 0.070 0.017 0.28***             
G14 -0.103 0.020 -0.091 -0.073 -0.225** 0.038 0.233*** 0.072 0.121 -0.053 0.110 0.153* -0.060           
G15 0.178** 0.080 0.096 -0.364*** 0.217** 0.000 -0.271*** 0.198** 0.109 0.182** -0.112 0.411*** 0.233*** -0.099         
G16 0.060 0.047 0.073 -0.220** 0.086 0.089 -0.193** 0.040 0.072 0.121 0.026 0.214** 0.301*** -0.057 0.418***       
G17 0.075 0.026 -0.039 -0.149 0.086 0.049 -0.048 0.094 0.040 -0.001 -0.072 0.119 -0.078 0.235*** 0.141 -0.075     
G18 -0.213** 0.023 -0.061 -0.115 -0.050 0.044 0.172* 0.083 0.075 -0.023 0.080 0.178** -0.069 0.565*** -0.014 0.073 0.195**   
Pearson correlation index between choices in row game and column game;                   
  *, ** and *** denote rejection at 10, 5 and 1 significant levels (Ho: correlation =0)                    
 
